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Introduction 
Welcome to the first issue of Undercurrents. This journal is the initiative 
of a group of graduate students at the Faculty of Environmental Studies 
at York University. Our motivation to publish a journal comes from a 
realization of the need for a forum to present critical and innovative 
graduate student work in the area of environmental studies. This, 
however, is an area of great diversity and a glance at the table of 
contents may leave some readers re-examining their assumptions about 
their notion of "environment." Indeed, it is the philosophy of Undercur-
rents to pursue the widest possible understanding of environment. 
Working within the interdisciplinary setting of the Faculty, we found 
that we share the belief that one-dimensional or single discipline 
approaches to our complex contemporary social and environmental 
problems are inadequate. What is needed, we feel, are approaches that 
are informed by the different disciplines but not limited by them. We 
want to present scholarly, but also creative and accessible works that 
challenge conventional thinking in the area of our annual theme. 
For this first issue we have chosen to explore the theme, "Human 
Interaction with the Natural Environment." The thread that winds its 
way through each of the papers is that at the heart of our "environmental 
crisis" is a flawed, but pervasive view of nature. Certainly, many views 
of "nature" can be found within society, but overall patterns reflect a 
human-centered and narrow utilitarian perspective. If we hope to change 
the destructive trends in society, we have to start rethinking our 
relationship to nature by redefining what we mean when we say "nature" 
and perhaps, also, by redefining what it means to be "human." We believe 
healthy and dignified human relationships are inextricably linked to 
healthy and caring human/non-human relationships. 
This issue begins with a paper by Jacqueline Pearce, in which she 
provides an overview of the various streams of thought within environ-
mentalism and ceo-feminism, and in turn, explores some of their common 
ground. The second paper by Gary Genosko offers a provocative re-
reading of Rachel Carson's classic Silent Spring. His imagery gives new 
meaning to the concepts of "the war against nature" and "military zone," 
where women get caught in the crossfire and children are conscripted into 
the battle. In a different light, Leesa Fawcett's analysis of 
anthropomorphism is a hopeful re-evaluation of this once taboo form of 
metaphor. She suggests that anthropomorphism can be a positive 
characteristic of a caring relationship with non-human nature. Lori 
Scheffel's paper on traditional literary expressions of the human 
relationship to other animals asks us to re-consider the potential for stories 
as a means for fostering healthier attitudes to non-human beings. 
Following this paper is Adrian Ivakhiv's modern-day fable about the 
disrespect for life that seems to characterize Industrial civilization. Mike 
Carr's paper is an exploration of paganistic and pantheistic themes in 
Antoine de Saint Exupery's The Little Prince, and Timothy Findley's Not 
Wanted on the Voyage. Finally, John R. Livingston's paper on the World 
Conservation Strategy attempts to locate this influential document within 
a long tradition of utopian thought, and considers the ironic possibility 
that it is no more than a blueprint for the dystopian domestication of the 
planet. 
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At each stage of the Journal's development the Editorial Board has 
received a great deal of support from students, staff and faculty. What 
follows, then, must be considered a joint effort by those who are 
acknowledged as well as others who provided assistance, encouragement 
and helpful suggestions along the way. We are especially grateful to Steve 
Lloyd and Jean-Marc Daigle for their participation in the group. Credit 
must a lso go to Mark Jowett, Julia Murphy, and Anne Pyke who were 
instrumental in helping to plan the Journal when it was still an idea. We 
are also ve ry thankful to Dean Edward Spence, Professor Gerry 
Carrothers, and to Frances Chan. 
The presen tation of critical environmental studies is, we think, one 
way of making academic research more relevant to our urgent social and 
ecological problems. With this Journal, then, we enter into and hope to 
encourage a thoughtful dialogue on these diverse issues. We wish to 
challenge mainstream thinking with these undercurrents of thought. We 
hope you enjoy the contributions to the dialogue in this issue. 
The Editors 
.--
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Approaches in Environmentalism and Feminism 
There is a global cnsts. It manifests itself in 
war, in poverty and social injustices, in rape, 
in violence against children, and in the assault 
on nature. There are those who interpret all 
these problems as unrelated and temporary, and 
there are those who consider these problems, not 
as separate, but as the result of one single crisis 
of worldview, or world/self-consciousness. 
Environmentalists and feminists are two groups 
which have emerged in reaction to the crises of 
our time. While their initial concerns may have 
been quite separate, today the two focuses are 
beginning to come together as the 
interconnection of global problems is revealed. 
Labels such as "environmentalism" and 
"feminism" tend to obscure the varieties of 
opinion which fall under each heading, and to 
imply only one definition. However, both 
feminism and environmentalism include a 
spectrum of proponents ranging from conserv-
ative to transformative. In this paper I would 
like to outline some general categories which I 
hope will help illuminate the various approaches 
within environmentalism and feminism. These 
are: maintainer, reformer, radical and 
VISionary.1 I call them "approaches" because 
they are ways of approaching the world (society 
and nature). It is my feeling that, while 
feminism and environmentalism originate from 
different concerns, at the transformation 
oriented end of the two spectrums the concerns 
and analysis of both begin to intersect. Their 
difference is in emphas is and terminology 
rather than substance. 
In general, the maintainer approach falls 
outside of feminism and environmentalism. 
However, a recognition of the existence of the 
maintainer category is useful in helping set the 
other approaches in context. Maintainers see 
the world as set. They tend to cling on to the 
way things are, desiring to maintain rather than 
change things. They view any problems which 
arise in society, or which are caused by our 
society (that is, Western society), as superficial, 
temporary, and solvable through economics or 
technological application. Maintainers may at 
times use language which seems to imply a 
desire for change, but when they talk of 
• 
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"progress" and "development" they refer only to 
the spreading or escalation of the current way 
of doing things. 
The reformers' approach to the world 
and problems within it is the least threatening 
to maintainers. By concentrating on individual 
issues and problems, reformers tinker with parts 
of the system, but leave the system (the way of 
things supported by the maintainer) intact. 
Reformers generally feel that problems or crises 
can be curbed through the regulation of 
behaviour, and that change can come about 
within the system, or within "the way things 
are." 
Radicals feel there is a problem with the 
current way things are that mere reforms can't 
alter. They wish to overthrow the structures of 
society, and to change or replace the whole 
system. There is a danger in the radicals' 
approach in that it can lead to the substitution 
of one structure for another without any real 
change to the patterns of behavior and 
interaction. It is easy for the maintainer to 
turn general opinion against the radical by 
raising fear that the radical threatens society's 
cherished values and current way of life. 
Visionaries2 are perhaps the most threat-
ening to maintainers because they attempt to 
transform those very values which the main-
tainers use as their defense. T he visionary 
approach focuses on what it sees as the core or 
nerve centre of society, the mythology, values 
and self-understanding of the society, which are 
usually safely insulated from the effects of any 
tinkering or altering done to the society's 
structural manifestations. The visionary 
emphasizes the need for a change in culture and 
consciousness, feeling that any revolutionary 
changes in the behaviour and structure of 
society must evolve from this core. The 
visionary is inspired by long-term and utopian 
vision. 
These four categories I have just de-
scribed are a simplistic division of possible 
approaches, and are not without overlap. A 
maintainer, for example, may appear to welcome 
Jacqueline Pearce is completing her Master in Environmental Studies at York Universi ty where she is focusin !( on environmental 
education, and on utopian vision in environmental thought. She is also interested in feminist utopian literature, ~r•. ,nd 
bioregionalism (her "place" being the British Columbia coast). 
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reforms in order to deflect attention, 
consciously or not, from the assumptions about 
the world that he/she clings to. A visionary 
on the other hand, may act out of the space of 
the reformer or radical because his/her personal 
vision is difficult to communicate, because of 
pressure to "act," or because results of a kind 
may be more recognizably and quickly seen in 
response to reforms. 
Environmentalists are concerned with the 
way we, as a society, treat the natural environ-
ment. Even within this central concern there 
are a variety of approaches, and a variety of 
ways "environment" is understood and related 
to. The maintainer, for example, views nature 
as a collection of resources with varying degrees 
of potential for human use. Resources, whether 
minerals, animals, plants or "scenic" areas, are 
considered to be objects which are, for all 
intents and purposes, devoid of life. Humans, 
if considered a part of nature at all, are 
considered, by virtue of their rationality, to be 
superior and in control. Our current industry 
and economy depends on the maintenance of 
this view of nature. 
Many environmentalists' arguments in 
defense of nature fall within the maintainer 
view, even though their sentiments may not. 
The terms "environment" and "environmentalist" 
are themselves products of the view which sees 
nature as external to humans. The resource 
conservation standpoint, for example, does not 
criticize society's way of thinking about nature 
or of doing things, it merely asks us to do 
things a bit more carefully, to "usc" nature more 
"wisely" and with some thought for the 
a vail ability of natural "resources" in to the 
future. The typical reform-oriented environ-
mentalist (environmentalists most visible in the 
media) attacks environmental problems piece-
meal, focusing on individual issues rather than 
on common roots or deeper connections between 
the issues. This type of environmentalist tends 
to seek quick reforms (which, while urgently 
needed, may turn out to be stop gaps only). 
In general the radical environmentalist 
category refers to those individuals or groups 
who claim that a switch in political ideology, 
or in the structuring of society, is what is 
needed to curtail environmental degradation. 
Marxists, for example, call for a redistribution 
of resources and a halt to their use for capital-
ist profit. However, this restructuring does not 
attempt to alter the maintainer's definition of 
nature as object. There are also a number of 
environmental groups, such as Greenpeace and 
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Earth First!, who have been labeled "radical." 
However, this label is based more on the actions 
of the groups than on any overall plan they 
might have to restructure society. These groups 
practice direct action in an attempt to prevent 
specific activities such as whaling or the cutting 
of forests. The results are immediate and 
usually media catching, but are not necessarily 
long-term. 
Visionaries see a link between how we 
conceive of nature and how we act. If we are 
able to define nature as "other" (which the word 
"environment" implies), then we will not be able 
to recognize our place within nature. 
Visionaries criticize the dominant worldview 
(that held by the maintainer) for its tendency 
to dichotomize (for example, to separate mind 
from body, intellect from intuition, culture 
from nature) and to assume one must be better 
than the other. Visionaries seek alternatives to 
hierarchical thinking through the validation of, 
for example, both intuition and reason, use-
value and intrinsic value, action and vision. 
Visionaries wish to re-subjectify nature, and to 
make valid non-utilitarian arguments for the 
preservation of nature. They seek to challenge 
and transform the very conception of what it 
means to be human and what it means to be 
nature. 
To summarize the three general environ-
mental approaches, reform environmentalists 
concentrate on being more careful with re-
sources, radicals concentrate on restructuring 
control and distribution of resources, and 
visionaries focus on altering the definition of 
nature so that "resources" no longer exist. The 
first focuses on changing behaviour, the second 
on restructuring the society in which behaviour 
occurs, and the third on transforming the 
consciousness from which behaviour flows. 
While feminism in general does not 
specifically include the natural environment in 
its sphere of concern, many feminists have 
begun to include a concern for nature, and for 
connected issues such as peace and nuclear 
disarmament, into their analyses and focuses. 
In Western society women have traditionally 
been associated with nature, a devalued nature 
which is considered separate and inferior to the 
world of men and culture/intellect. Feminists 
are reacting to this association, as well as to 
environmental degradation, when they bring 
environmental concerns into feminism. Reaction 
may take a variety of forms. 
Some feminists, who may be considered 
reformers, react to the women-nature connection 
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by attempting to sever women's association with 
nature and to join with male culture in its 
position over nature. This feminist perspective 
seeks to "better" women's position (or at least 
that of some women), but offers no more than 
superficial criticism of the "way things are." It 
simply calls for greater mobility of women 
within the hierarchy of the system, but does not 
at all call for a different kind of system (it 
questions neither the structures of society or the 
worldview). 
Radical feminists such as Marxist feminists 
and socialist feminists have more extensive 
analyses, but generally do not incorporate the 
dominant conception of nature into their 
critiques. They seck to sever the connection of 
women with nature, recognizing it as socially 
constructed, but for the most part, they do not 
question the socially constructed nature-culture 
dualism. Marxist feminists, for example, 
associate themselves with male workers in an 
attempt to overthrow capitalism. They feel that 
problems will be alleviated once the capitalist 
system is replaced, but do not question the 
conception of nature as a resource which can be 
utilized to meet the material needs of humans. 
Some Marxist feminists have suggested that by 
associating nature with the oppressed class of 
workers, it too might be incorporated into the 
concerns of Marxists. Again, th is assumes that 
altering of structures will alter relationships, 
but docs not address the conceptual assumptions 
which influence relationships. 
Another radical approach within feminism 
is a branch which is ref erred to specifically as 
"radical feminism." It roots women's oppression 
in reproductive biology and in male-control of 
women's fertility and sexuality, and believes 
women will be free only when they are "no 
longer bound by the constraints of compulsory 
heterosexuality and compulsory child-bearing 
and child-rearing roles".3 Some radical feminists 
seek to emphasize women's association with 
nature rather than to sever it. These feminists 
see women's con nect ion to nature as feeding 
into a separate "women's culture." They desire, 
not to gain a higher place in patriarchal society, 
but to separate from patriarchal society or to 
supplan t patriarchy with a more matriarchal 
society based on values deemed already present 
in "women's culture." The "radical feminist" 
approach differs from the Marxist approaches 
in that, not only does it focus on changing the 
organization and structure of society, it often 
attempts to integrate alternative modes of 
knowing and being, such as women's mystical, 
intuitive or spiritual experiences and a celebra-
tion of the female body, into feminist theory 
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and epistemology. In this respect it resembles 
the focus of the visionary. Although this type 
of radical feminism may wish to alter society's 
value and consciousness of nature and women, 
it tends to confirm or even exaggerate the 
dualistic conception of women and men as 
essentially different and separate. For this 
reason I have associated it with the general 
radical category rather than with the visionary, 
although it obviously has visionary elements. 
Visionary feminism entails addressing the 
link between women's oppression and the 
oppression of nature, and the interconnections 
between all forms of oppression. While 
recognizing the structural forms oppression 
takes, it focuses on the conceptua l basis. In 
other words, it seeks a transformation of the 
consciousness of both men and women so that 
the current structures and behaviours no longer 
have any foundation from which to stand. It 
seeks to rcconceptualize what it means to be 
human, what it means to be man or woman, 
and what it means to live and interact on this 
earth. The visionary approach requires a new 
human vision of being and relationship which 
does not dichotomize or limit possibilities. The 
visionary feminist seems to be particularly 
sensitive to the need to address the current 
disjuncture between action and theor y in order 
to form a n approach to social change that is 
rooted in both. 
While the reformer, radical and visionary 
may all have a role to play in bringing about 
needed change, it is the visionary that is most 
often neglected or maligned by the other groups, 
and margina l ized by society in general. Much 
of the recent debate within environmental 
thought has focused on internal name calling 
and rivalry.4 While recognizing the variety of 
focuses within environmentalism and attempting 
to break the general stereotype of 
"environmentalist," I also feel it is a mistake 
for different interests within environmentalism 
to alienate themselves from each other by 
emphasizing differences rather than commonali-
ties. I feel that visionary feminism and vision-
ary environmentalism, for example, have much 
in common, and can gain strength in relation-
ship. 
Both vJsJOnary feminism and VISIOnary 
environmentalism developed in response to what 
they saw as lacking in feminism and in 
environmentalism. With in the broad environ-
mentalist group, individuals began to criticize 
the tendency for environmental problems to be 
discussed in the utilitarian terms of the main-
tai nc rs and to be treated as separate unrelated 
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issues. Many of these people felt a conflict 
between their own non-utilitarian love for 
nature and the approach they felt compelled to 
take as environmentalists attempting to bring 
environmental problems to the attention of the 
public and legal system. In 1973 Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess coined the terms 
"shallow ecology" and "deep ecology" to describe 
the reform oriented approach common to 
environmentalists and a deeper or spiritual 
oriented approach which developed from a 
sensitivity to the relationship between human 
and nonhuman life. 
Deep ecology can be broadly defined to 
include all those individuals engaged in deeply 
questioning cultural assumptions about nature 
and the place of humans in nature.5 Many deep 
ecologists are inspired by a personal experience 
of nature (especially wild nature) which leads 
them to intuit or sense that all components of 
nature have intrinsic value and that each 
depends, both physically and "spiritually," on its 
connection to the whole. Deep ecologists 
question the cultural assumption that human 
beings are superior to other components of 
nature, and that humans can and should control 
nature. In attempting to free themselves from 
this cultural baggage, they look to the above 
personal experience as a more valid informant 
about human-nature relationships (this 
validation of personal experience is similar to 
feminist reclamation of women's personal 
experience as knowledge source). 
The basic difference between the deep 
ecological approach and the ecological feminist 
approach is that deep ecologists speak of 
anthropocentrism (human-centredness) as the 
root of our culture's destructive relationship 
with nature, while ecofeminists speak of andro-
centrism (male-centredness) as the root. This 
critical focus on anthropocentrism also differ-
entiates deep ecologists from other visionaries, 
such as socia l ecologists who do not necessarily 
question the notion of human significance.6 
Deep ecologists advocate biocentrism, or life-
centredness, rather than human-centredness, 
claiming that all organisms and entities are 
equal in intr insic worth and have an equal right 
to grow and unfold within the pattern of the 
whole. In suggesting that human beings are not 
superior or more significant, the intention of 
deep ecologists is not to devalue human life, but 
to resacrilize a ll of nature. 
Deep ecology draws from a variety of 
disciplines, including ecology, psychology, 
history and philosophy, and the traditions of 
Christianity, Taoism, Buddhism, and Native 
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Indian spirituality. It considers itself to be 
more an approach than an ideology, seeking to 
facilitate the process of questioning and of 
stretching perceptions, rather than attempting 
to articulate a specific platform. Deep ecology 
is then, not a fixed theory or static set of ideas, 
and may be described with some variation from 
person to person. It is described by George 
Sessions and Arne Naess as based on the 
following principles: 
I. The well-being and flourishing of human 
and nonhuman Life on Earth have value 
in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, 
inherent value). These values are independ-
ent of the usefulness of the nonhuman 
world for human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms con-
tribute to the realization of these values 
and are also values in themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this 
richness and di~·ersity except to satisfy 
vital needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures 
is compatible with a substantial decrease 
of the human population. The flourishing 
of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 
5. Present human interference with the 
nonhuman world is excessive. and the 
situation is rapidly worsening. 
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These 
policies affect basic economic, technolog-
ical, and ideological structures. The 
resulting state of affairs will be deeply 
different from the present. 
7. The ideological change is mainly that of 
appreciating life quality (dwelling in 
situations of inherent value) rather than 
adhering to an increasingly higher stand-
ard of living. There will be profound 
awareness of the difference between big 
and great. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points 
have an obligation directly or indirectly to 
try to implement the necessary changes.1 
These statements are intended not as 
dogma, but as suggestions which each individ-
ual can interpret, qualify, and elaborate in 
his/ her own way. 
To summarize, vision:~ ry environment-
alists criticize the dominant worldview's em-
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phasis on individualism, independence, compet-
itiveness, rationalism, centralization, homogeniz-
ation, and material consumption. They seek to 
reclaim values such as interdependence, 
cooperation, caring, intuition, decentralization, 
diversity, and simplicity of material wants, and 
to expand our concept of community to include 
the nonhuman. They are guided by a utopian 
vision of a transformed society, yet recognize 
that such a vision is important, not as an end 
to be reached, but as a transforming tooL The 
term "visionary" encompasses both interior and 
exterior vision, recogni~ing that there are many 
ways of "seeing" and knowing. Ideally, the 
visionary attempts to reevaluate and reawaken 
possibilities of understanding and consciousness 
that have been suppressed or unrealized, and 
docs not attempt to suggest that there is one 
"right way." 
Although I have used deep ecology here 
to represent the visionary environmentalist 
category, I in no way wish to suggest that the 
category is limited to deep ecology. In general, 
the term "visionary environmentalist" refers to 
those individuals who base their work on the 
intuition of interrelatedness between human and 
nonhuman components of the global ecosystem, 
and who look to the cultural obscuring and 
distorting of this relation as the source of crisis. 
Visionary feminists have a similar focus, 
but their approach is from the perspective of 
feminist analysis, which is deeply concerned 
with the oppression of women and with the 
exclusion of women from stories about the 
world. These feminists have also been called 
"ceo-feminists," as their concerns incorporate 
the ecosystem. However, not all ceo-feminists 
can be considered visionary, as l have attempted 
to show in my discussion of the various 
responses to the woman-nature connection. 
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Karen Warren's description of what she calls 
"transformative feminism" articulates much of 
what I mean by visionary feminism. She 
criticizes the four leading versions of feminism, 
"liberal feminism, traditional Marxist feminism, 
radical feminism, and socialist feminism," and 
calls for an ecological feminism which expands 
upon the "traditional conception of feminism 
as 'the movement to end women's oppression' 
by recognizing and making explicit the inter-
connections between aJI systems of oppression."8 
Drawing from Warren's definition and from 
Ynestra King's description of eco-feminism9 I 
have outlined what seem to be the main 
principles of a visionary feminism: 
1) The domination of nature and the 
domination of sex, race and class arc 
intimately connected and mutually 
reinforcing. The liberation of women 
requires the elimination of all systems 
of oppression. 
2) Reality is socially constructed. Hierarchy 
is a social construction projected onto 
nature and used to justify domination. 
Life on earth is an interconnected web, 
not a hierarchy. 
3) Although the women-nature connection 
is a social construction it may be used 
as a vantage point for creating a dif-
ferent kind of culture which transcends 
the nature-culture distinction, and which 
draws from so-called "female" values and 
ethics (caring, nurturing, reciprocity, 
community, etc.). 
4) While, as a subordinate group, women's 
experiences and ways of knowing may 
d iffer from mens', those experiences arc 
themselves diverse and varied. We need 
to recognize common interests, and to 
celebrate and provide room for diversity 
(in natural and social systems). 
5) We need to rcth ink what it means to be 
human from a non-patriarchal 
framework, recognizing interconnections 
between human and nonhuman nature. 
This would involve a "psychological 
restructuring of our attitudes and beliefs 
about ourselves and 'our world' (includ-
ing nonhuman world) and a philosoph-
ical rethinking of the notion of self such 
that we sec ourselves as both co-members 
of an ecological community and vet 
different from other members of it."10 
6) Transformation on a personal level 
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requires a corresponding restructuring of 
social relations, economic and political 
structures, and science and technologies, 
according to principles of care and reci-
procity rather than of individualism and 
control. 
These characteristics of visionary femin-
ism, while worded differently, correspond in 
many ways to the characteristics of visionary 
environmentalism. Both are based on a 
recognition of interconnection, diversity, and of 
the need to transform our consciousness, 
institutions and technology to reflect this 
recogn1t10n. Both understand the current 
escalation of en vi ron menta 1 and social injustices 
as rising from the Western ..;ultural construction 
of reality, and as reversible only through the 
deconstruction of that reality in order that new 
possibilities are revealed. 
The visionary is often dismissed as utop-
ian or impractical because he/she strives for a 
reality different from the present. The vision-
ary may be criticized for not being adequately 
"political" or action-oriented because she/he sees 
significant social change as arising slowly out 
of a transformation of individual and cultural 
consciousness. However, action for the 
vtswnary, can occur on many levels: on a 
personal level of inner growth and exploration, 
on the level of ideas and intellectual argument, 
on the level of lifestyle and relationships, on 
the level of political activism, and on the level 
of myth-making, ritual and art. The visionary 
agrees that we need to deal with issues now, but 
says this is not enough. Until we transform 
our very way of thinking and relating to the 
world, the rape, destruction and exploitive 
manipulation of life will continue. 
When I speak of transforming conscious-
ness it seems very abstract and amorphous 
because it points to a way of being that is not 
yet fully visualized or understood. Once 
possibilities become known and familiar they 
gain solidity and reality. The ideas of the 
VlStonary may seem unrealistic and incom-
prehensible now, because they have been 
excluded from the maintainer's (dominant 
society's) repertoire of possibilities. The 
transforming of consciousness requires a recog-
nition of the limitation of one's repertoire so 
that what lies outside these limitations can be 
glimpsed. The visionary's task is to deconstruct 
the dominant western version of reality so that 
its foundations and limitations can be 
determined and revealed, and to open new 
ground (through the encouragement of wonder, 
and the opening to ever broadening possibilities 
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of experience and relationship) so that the seeds 
of a new reality can be planted. For the 
visionary, it is only through such exercises that 
the global crisis can be recognized for what it 
is and the possibilities of hope glimpsed. 
Notes 
1. These categories were inspired by a set of categories developed 
by Steve Kline to describe environmentalists (activist, radical, 
visionary) and by dian marino to describe social change 
(maintenance, reform, structural). Kline and marino are 
Professors at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York 
University, North York, Ont. 
2. I use the term "visionary" to give a sense of a broad, over-
arching perspective, rather than a narrowly focused perspective. 
The transformation orientation differentiates the visionary 
approach I describe from the more general use of the term 
"visionary." I considered using the term "transformative' instead 
of "visionary" in order to avoid any association of "vision" with 
sight dominance, but I felt "visionary" was a word with more 
resonations. For me, the word "vision" takes on a metaphorical 
quality which evokes an inner sense which is informed by more 
than sight or visualization 
3. Karen Warren, "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," 
Environmental Ethics, 9:1 (1987), p.14. 
4. See Murray Bookchin, "Social Ecology vs Deep Ecology" and 
Janet Biehl, "It's Deep, But is it Broad? An Eco-feminist Looks 
at Deep Ecology," Kick It Over, July 1988. These articles, 
while bringing up some important points, are written in a 
combative tone, dismissing deep ecology because of statements 
made primarily by Dave Foreman, founder of the activist-
oriented environmental organization Earth First! While 
criticizing comments made by Foreman is justified, it is 
inaccurate to suggest that his personal opinion represents deep 
ecology as a whole, or even Earth First! as a whole. For a 
responsible comment on the deep ecology/eco-feminism/social 
ecology debate see Warwick Fox, "The Deep Ecology /Eco-
feminism Debate and its Parallels," Environmental Ethics, 11 
(1989). 
5. This broad use of the term deep ecology includes many 
individuals who do not call themselves "deep ecologists" and 
who, in fact, prefer to steer away from the label for various 
reasons. John Livingston and Neil Evernden are Canadian 
examples. See Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981}, Evernden, The 
Natural Alien (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), and 
other writings by Evernden and Livingston. 
6. Social ecology is a visionary approach with roots in Marxism 
and anarchism. Although social ecology attempts to dissolve the 
hierarchical model of nature in which humans dominate, Murray 
Bookchin's writings imply that humans are the most significant 
species by virtue of their self-consciousness. For an elaboration 
of social ecology see The Ecology of Freedom (Palo Alto: 
Cheshire Books, 1982) and other writings by Murray Bookchin. 
7. Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology (Salt Lake 
City: Peregrine Smith, 1985). p.70 (principles recorded in April 
1984). 
8. Warren, p.l8 
9. Ynestra King, "The Ecology of Feminism and the Feminism 
of Ecology," Harbinger: The JoUI'Ilal of Social Ecology, vol. 1 
(1983), pp. 16-22. 
10. Warren, p.l9. 
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Re-reading Silent Spring 
Rachel Carson's historic book Silent Spring\ 
published in 1962, may not have marked the 
beginning of what we might call modern 
environmentalism -- although she might have 
been the mother of such a movement -- but it 
did make a major contribution to the 
development of a widespread ecological con-
sciousness and encouraged environmentally 
sound practices. 
The fact that it was a major force does 
not explain why we should re-read it today. 
However, many "environmentalists" today are 
prepared to reproduce moments from their 
personal experiences of the public furor which 
the book caused. At their worst, such reminis-
cences may prove to be p lastic enough to 
generate life-style advertisements based on the 
late 1980's near ubiquitous theme of nostalgia 
for the real, which can only be found in "the 
1960's." At their best, one might recall that 
Carson made the idea of the interrelatedness 
of all living beings the central tenet of all her 
work and did so in an especially poignant way 
in Silent Spring.2 In reflecting upon the life 
of the theme of interrelatedness, one may 
inquire into the implications of Carson's 
understanding of it in causal terms, thus 
implicating herself in what has been called the 
crisis of environmentalism.8 
These are not so much reasons "why" we 
should re-read Silent Spring as they arc 
expressions of the sense that in environmenta l 
thought one is constantly re-reading it, if only 
in bits, touching lightly upon the ideas (both 
deep and superficial) which it helped to 
popularize, and even being touched by the book 
in the oddest ways -- as one passes a dog-eared 
copy on the shelf of a used book store, or 
perusing the re-readings which placed it in a 
before-after frame: Frank Graham's Since 
Silent Spring (J 970) and James Whorton's Before 
Silent Spring ( 1974). 
The re-reading that I will present may be 
likened to a stone skipping across the sur face of 
a pond: just as the stone makes contact with 
the water at certa in points along its trajectory, 
my reading touches down upon an apparently 
disconnected series of images in the text. The 
* 
by Gary A. Genosko 
images of men with spray guns, with assorted 
spraying paraphernalia and the accounts of 
women who lived with the indiscriminate 
application of pesticides and herbicides will 
serve to define the trajectory of this line of 
flight. 
I consider these images because they 
represent moments of epiphany in my ongoing 
engagement with Carson's work in the larger 
context of a concern with the problematic status 
of military concepts in environmentalism and 
social science in general. Carson lead us to 
reconsider a certain kind of soldier: the man 
with the spray gun. As she put it: "under the 
philosophy that now seems to guide our 
destinies, nothing must get in the way of the 
man with the spray gun" (p. 83). Carson's use 
of "our" must be seen to refer to the destiny of 
humankind. However, the revelation that the 
man with the spray gun is a functionary of a 
destructive philosophical notion which holds 
sway over the destiny of humankind, gathers 
force from the reports and accounts of women. 
For instance, in Silent Spring we f i nd that 
women wrote in despair about the disappearance 
of birds (p. 97), about the dread of having 
beautiful birds dying in the backyard (p. 101), 
about finding 12 dead robins lying on the lawn 
(p. 103), about the meaning of elm trees (p. 107), 
and the destruction of wildflowers (p. 72). It is 
insofar as women provide striking eyewitness 
accounts of spraying operations and report 
changes that have occurred around the home -
- from the house-hold to the homeland -- after 
the "control men" have used their spray guns, 
that Carson's critique carries an affective force. 
Women, then , are victims of the spray gun 
because they stand in between the gu n and its 
target. 
In one instance Carson noted that a 
group of "field men" (United States Forest 
Service, Bridger National Forest, Wyoming) 
"considered it hilariously funny that an old lady 
had opposed the plan [spraying of sagelands] 
because the wi ldflowers would be destroyed" 
(p. 72). Still, women's action seeks to mitigate 
the "philosophy that seems to gu ide our 
destinies." What seems can be exposed, 
unmasked a nd debunked, thus opening up the 
Gary A. Genosko is an alumnus of F.E.S., where he worked on such matters as the militarization of nature and the militarism 
of environmentalism. He is currently a doctoral candidate in Social and Political Thought at York, where he is working on the post-
metaphysics of Jean Baudrillard. At one time Gary fancied himself a philosopher, and comported hunsdf in that manner, but he has 
now reformed and loves folly as much aa wisdom. 
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possibility of a different destiny. 
The noun sprayer has come to refer to a 
device which is used for spreading or diffusing 
insecticides and herbicides over vegetation. 
Early instruments for applying spray included 
the splint-broom which, circa 1885, was used to 
apply "bouillie Bordellaise," the so-called 
Bordeaux mixture, against fungal diseases of 
grapevines.4 Indeed, in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, wet arsenical poisons were 
sprayed by bucket, knapsack and barrel pumps, 
horse drawn, power and tower sprayers. 
Further, the noun 'spray-er, derived from the 
Greek speirein (to sow, sea tter) retains the idea 
of spreading something but does so at the 
expense of what is spread. Ironically, one 
spreads a poison on what one has sown in order 
to reap what one has sown. Such is the work of 
the Reaper. 
The question of the relationship between 
the fluid which moves through the adjustable 
nozzle and the target of the gun raises an 
important issue. If we say that the spray gun 
has a "target," as the "nozzle men" are want to 
say, we might mean an area, species, disease, or 
micro-organism. It is more appropriate to say 
of a gun that sprays that it has a direction since 
it is only in virtue of the folly of isolation that 
a target can be said to be taken down cleanly. 
Even if one wants to insist that the targets can 
be and are hit, such "targets" do not have 
clearly defined boundaries and neither, since we 
are dealing with a spray, does the ammunition. 
A central theme of Silent Spring is the dark 
folly of isolation in the light of the basic 
premise of ecology: the literal interrelatedness 
of the parts of the ecosystem. The facile, 
separative logic of the gun club, if you will or, 
as Carson put it, "the shotgun approach to 
nature," has outlived its uselessness. Even the 
man who shapes "our destinies" cannot escape 
nor protect himself from the vapors which he 
spreads because he wears them like a shroud. 
Carson's explicit polemic against entomol-
ogy culminates in her use of a remark made by 
F.H. Jacobs: "the activities of many so-called 
economic entomologists would make it appear 
that they operate in the belief that salvation lies 
at the end of a spray nozzle" (p. 229). The 
spray gun is the tool par excellence of the 
overzealous entomologist. Indeed, for Carson, 
many "outstanding entomologists" were no more 
than lackey's of the chemical industry. The 
spray gun has been and is a choice weapon in 
all environmental warfare. To think of the 
spray gun, however it has been modified, in the 
context of environmental warfare is to 
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foreshadow and gather retrospectively its 
military applications in anti-plant warfare and 
area-denial operations. Although Carson did 
not explicitly investigate environmental warfare 
in Silent Spring, the equally disastrous conse-
quences of non-military spraying programs 
might have been a revelation for some. That 
is, if Carson was right about the devastation 
wrought by spraying, then such spraying may 
be conducted on enemy territory against 
"foreign" soil, plants, water, human and non-
human populations. By a diabolical subversion, 
Silent Spring could be read as a text for 
military planners. 
In Silent Spring women quite literally 
speak out from under the spray gun: "they 
sprayed the quarter-acre lots of suburbia, 
drenching a housewife making a desperate 
effort to cover her garden" (p. 143). Under the 
misty veil spread by the spray planes, women 
and specifically housewives, as Carson was 
careful to note on several occasions, have been 
covered with strange airs because they were at 
home during the daytime sprayings. While it 
would be incorrect to insist that women are 
targeted by the "control men" in the spray 
planes, suffice it to say that the situation of 
women at home made them part of the target of 
the daytime aerial bombardments. Throughout 
Silent Spring women who have been sprayed 
request that the practice of spraying cease (p. 
144) and, if they use aerosol sprays in the home, 
they contract "environmental diseases" (pp. 202-
3). 
Recall that Silent Spring began with 
reference to the strangest of all "airs," those 
which suit no one. The "Fable for Tomorrow" 
stands apart from the text not as a preface or 
an introduction but as a vision of a spring of 
the future without non-human (and likely 
human, as well) life. It is not a legend, 
although it makes general references to disasters 
which have happened some-where (and are 
brought together by the opening phrase, "There 
was once a town in the heart of America ... "), 
nor is it strictly fabulous since Carson describes 
in detai l later in the book many of the disasters 
which loosely shape the fable. We are lead to 
believe that Carson's "Fable" is a likely story if 
the misuse of certain agents goes unchecked. 
When Carson writes that "everywhere was 
a shadow of death" and describes this shadow 
as a "strange blight," "evil spell," a "white 
granular powder" which fell like snow a few 
weeks earlier, her model is nuclear fallout. The 
radioactive isotope Strontium-90 "was a tool to 
help her explain the properties of pesticides."5 
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Strontium-90, which appears before DDT in 
Silent Spr ing, is her yardstick of pollutants. 
A silent spring is a mild nuclear winter. 
Remarking upon Carson's attention to "the 
connotations of words," Carol B. Gartner 
observes that: "when she writes of a 'world that 
is urged to beat its plowshares into spray guns', 
she introduces a sardonic play on words 
reversing the biblical injunction to beat swords 
into ploughshares."6 Carson's message of peace 
is clear: let there be no nuclear winters, even 
"mild" ones. 
Concerning the social meaning of spraying 
paraphernalia, Carson writes: 
The mores of suburbia now 
dictate that crabgrass must go at 
whatever cost. Sacks containing 
chemicals designed to rid the lawn of 
such despised vegetation have become 
almost a status symbol. These weed-
killing chemicals are sold under brand 
names that never suggest their identity 
or nature. 
The descriptive literature that 
may be picked up in any hardware - or 
garden-supply store seldom if ever 
reveals the true hazard involved in 
handling and applying the material. 
Instead. the typical illustration portrays 
a happy family scene, father and son 
smilingly preparing to apply the 
chemical to the lawn, small children 
tumbling Ol'er the grass with a dog. (p. 
161) 
While much has been said about the uses and 
effects of pesticides and herbicides, little if 
anything has been said, in the context of 
critical environmental thought, a bout how the 
chemicals became part of everyday life. 
Like hunting and fishing, the application 
of weed-killer is represented as an activity for 
father and son. The ability to handle a gun 
lies with the father and will be passed on to 
the son; the spray gun is a weapon that is 
embedded in a patrocentric complex. The 
chemical lawn tools also acquire value in terms 
of competitive consumption: the very presence 
of a sack of chemicals, says Carson, is a con-
spicuous reminder of the social standing of the 
family relative, of course, and primarily so, to 
the block and the neighbourhood, the places 
where such sacks and their results are visible 
and open· to inspection or display. It is the 
lawn or "the grounds," as it were, that is a 
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tangible sign-complex or sign-cluster of social 
success and control. 
The image-fetish of the nuclear family 
which one finds in the product literature serves 
to mask the intrinsic features, the physical 
properties, of the chemicals in question and, in 
addition, hides the ecological relations into 
which they enter and out of which they were 
produced. 
The spray gun targets dandelion, clover, 
creeping charlie, chickweed and other types of 
undesirable vegetation in a sign system in which 
keeping one's grass "clean and cut" is a desirable 
social goal and practice. Further, the 
aforementioned plants have been transformed 
into weeds and thus are exiled from the lawn 
in virtue of their difference from certain highly 
engineered species of grasses. The place for 
weeds is other than the lawn in relation to an 
image of what a lawn should be -- a set of 
arbitrary inclusions and exclusions. The pos-
session and use of the spray gun marks one's 
ongoing battle agaimt wildness, and wild plants, 
which threaten the tranquil domesticity of the 
home front. Weeds cause rifts in the home's 
green apron. 
In contemporary advertising material for 
C-1-L Inc. ("Guide To The Perfect Lawn" and 
"How To Protect Your Garden Against Insects 
And Disease") , there is a readymade semiotics 
of the yard. We are told that there are: i) 
problems; ii) places where problems occur; iii) 
symptoms of problems; iv) the answer or 
solution; v) a time when one should solve the 
problem. For instance, if one's problem is aphis 
at the tips of branches and on the undersides of 
the leaves of fruits, vegetables and ornamentals, 
and one reads the symptoms as sticky deposits 
and the curling of leaves, the solution includes 
Fruit and Garden Insect Killer (Diazinon), 
Ornamental Insect Killer (Malathion) and Tree 
and Shrub Insect Killer (DUTOX), which should 
be applied when the aphis are first noticed --
"repeat as necessary." This set of procedures 
gives one a clear cut way of decoding one's 
yard and assigning meaning to insects in 
relation to plants. What is important is that one 
acquires the competence to communicate about 
the yard and how to treat it with the knowledge 
and language provided by the chemical 
industries and their advertising agencies. 
There has not been a significant negative 
investment at the level of chemicals themselves. 
A defetishization of the product literature and 
the chemical-based logic of yard care might 
produce the widespread understanding that: if 
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brand "x" or product "x" contains a certain 
substance "y," or even appears to be connected 
with "y" and "y" is known to kill certain 
animals, or can be shown to be found in certain 
animals in "unusual" amounts, then brand "x" 
signifies "kills animals" in a system of meaning 
in which weed killers contain deadly poisons 
and kill more than crabgrass. One needs to 
learn how to reverse the meaning of "blemishes" 
in one's yard so as to attribute their appearance 
to the very things which purport to correct 
them. 
A vtstt to a garden-supply store reveals 
that at present women are a target group in the 
marketing of spray guns. While the target 
audience has expanded, we still find that it is 
the man who uses the leisure tools ("no more 
digging or pulling") of the chemical industry. 
The fact that women have become part of the 
target audience perhaps seeks to undermine the 
lessons of Silent Spring as we have read them 
to the extent that women have testified against 
the man with the spray gun in what might be 
called a nascent ceo-feminism. 
The notion of a "problem" in the yard that 
has a chemical solution which may be delivered 
by the spray gun docs not and cannot overcome 
the folly of isolation since the solution, insofar 
as pesticides have led to the destruction of non-
targeted, non-problems, is itself a problem. The 
solution to the multiplication of problems 
(identifiable and at present or for a time 
unidentifiable) cannot be found within the logic 
of the "care" of the yard and garden because 
problems and targets may only be isolated in an 
abstract sense which is contrary to the literal, 
material and living interrelatedness of the 
ecosystem. The logic of the problem-symptom-
solution does not -- and this should come as no 
surprise -- take into account the valuative 
insights and scientific evidence presented in 
Silent Spring. 
Can one reinvent the lawn? Carson docs 
not ask us to do so, but points, however 
unwittingly, to the dangers associated with 
taking chemical solutions to lawn problems for 
granted, as natural decoding practices. The 
idea of the lawn: of color, length, vegetative 
monotony, flatness, etc., is so rarely challenged. 
The thorough domestication of the yard --
through grafting, cutting, pulling, dividing, 
spraying, fencing -- will not give way easily to 
a new encoding in the form, perhaps, of a 
woodlot-like area or a meadow. But the 
possibility of a radicalization of the lawn, of 
the emergence of a relatively undisciplined 
space, one which does not stew in its own 
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stupefying JUices, is blocked by the fence: 
frontyard and backyard. The fence, like the 
bar of the sign, no matter if it is thin as paper 
or as difficult to cross as some borders, separ-
ates and must be overgrown. 
The operations of the strange soldier of 
ecological fortune which Carson identified, the 
man with the spray gun, amount to an ongoing 
war against enemy insects. Certain maggots, 
worms and moths "tunnel" into fruits; beetles 
"invade" tomatoes and corn; caterpillars conduct 
"defoliation" operations on ornamental trees. In 
response to these enemy incursions, the man 
with the spray gun chooses the Garden Insect 
Killer "Ambush," for instance, and gives his 
veggies "a fighting chance," as C-I-L teaches him 
to say. The field of battle is the yard: lawn 
and garden. 
With a final skip to no other, the audible 
landscape of our adventure falls silent. All 
quiet, except on the home front. 
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Anthropomorphism: 
As a conservationist and an environmental 
educator, I am intrigued by human relationships 
with animals. The umbrella question for me is 
in what ways do people relate to animals at this 
moment in Western history? I have focussed 
here on one type of relationship that humans 
have with animals -- the anthropomorphic 
relationship. 
How would you know anthropomorphism 
if you bumped into it? The Greek word 
"anthropomorphos" literally means "shaped like 
a man." The range of meanings in the Random 
House dictionary (1966) includes the following: 
"anthropomorphic l. ascribing human forms or 
attributes to a being or thing not human, esp. to 
a deity; and anthropomorphize: to ascribe human 
forms or attributes to (an animal, plant, 
material object, etc.)."1 The commonly accepted 
definition of anthropomorphism implies a 
distinct separation between the human and the 
non-human. I do not assume that we, humans, 
are so neatly separated from the animal world. 
I believe Nature and "animalness" is not only 
found "out there" in the shrinking wilderness 
areas, but is just as much "in here," inside us. 
Hence my fascination with the anthropomorphic 
relationships began. 
Traditionally, to anthropomorphize was 
heretical because one was ascribing human 
characteristics to a deity -- an unforgivable 
insult to the integrity of the deity to be likened 
to a mere mortal. Nowadays, the major "faux 
pas" lies in ascribing human characteristics to 
animals or "beasts," .thus slandering the sacred 
character of humans. So at first it was a 
defamation to see a god as Uke a human, and 
now it is sacrilegious to see a human as like an 
animal. This, in and of itself, is an intriguing 
historical change. 
Neil Evernden, in "Nature In Industrial 
Society," suggests that this taboo against 
anthropomorphism has something to do with 
the fact that we live in an age of secular 
humanism.2 God is supposedly dead and human 
individuals are the main source of value and 
meaning. The general feeling is that 
anthropomorphism is a cultural no-no, and 
• 
In The Web of Culture 
by Leesa Fawcett • 
definitely unscientific, yet it keeps reappearing. 
We tend to be anthropomorphic. 
The way in which people conceive of 
anthropomorphism is intimately connected to 
the way in which they perceive their relation-
ship to nature. Anthropomorphism is not an 
isola ted phenomenon. It is found hanging 
precariously in a web, connected to all the 
"facts" and values, thoughts and feelings that 
we, as individuals, hold and collectively rein-
force among ourselves as a culture. The 
definition of anthropomorphism one works from 
depends on one's focal point. Do you see 
humans as the centre point, and then you 
magnanimously ascribe human characteristics 
to animals? Or do you see humans in relation-
ship with (historically and bodily), and con-
tinuous with nature? From this latter reference 
point one could identify commonalities in our 
shared experience of life. Of course there are 
many possible places to start, but I am con-
centrating on these two polar ones and the ir 
consequences. 
The dominant way of seeing the world 
is an anthropocentric one. Humans are 
generally thought to be the centre of the world 
and the pinnacle of evolution. This type of 
thinking is reflected in the embedded concept 
of "man as the measure of all things."3 The 
anthropocentric view is expressed implicitly in 
the commonly reiterated ideas of "dominance 
over nature" and "nature valued as a human 
resource." In stark opposition to this dominant 
framework, alternative environmental world-
v iews believe in "nature valued in and of itself," 
and "harmony with nature." 
Tables I and II illustrate this point by 
juxtaposing the dominant paradigm with: a well 
outlined generic environmental paradigm by 
Stephen Cotgrove (Table I), and the beliefs of 
deep ecology as presented by George Sessions 
and Bill Devall (Table II). I was struck by the 
similarities between the two descriptions of the 
dominant paradigm. Cotgrove explains that the 
dominant social paradigm is "dominant not in 
the statistical sense of being held by most 
people, but in the sense that it is the paradigm 
Leesa Fawcett, a marine biologist and environmental educator, recently completed her Master in Environmental Studies at 
York Univel'llity. Her thesis focused on children's anthropomorphic conceptions of animals. She ia currently teaching part-time in 
the Faculty of Environmental Studies. 
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Table 1: COUNTER PARADIGMS 
Da.inant Paradi~ Alternative Environ-
_,tal Panldi~ 
Core Material Non-material 
values (economic growth) (self-actualization) 
Natural environ- Natural environaent 
ment valued as a intrinsicly valued 
resource 
Domination over Harmony with nature 
nature 
Economy Market forces 










Law and order 







































Limits to science 
Rationality of ends 
Integration of fact/ 
value, thought/feeling 
*Some environmentalists want a return to small-
scale communities because they provide a 
traditional organic order -- differentiate d, 
hierarchical, and stable. 
(From: Cotgrove, Stephen, catastrophe or 
Cornucopia (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), p. 
27.) 
held by dominant groups in industrial societies, 
and in the sense that i t se rves to legitimate and 
justify the institutions and practices of a 
market economy."4 
To be anthropomorphic does not necessarily 
mean one is anthropocentric. For instance, I am 
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anthropomorphic with my dogs (as I'm sure are 
many companion animal owners), and I believe 
that humans arc continuous with nature and not 
the most important member. We are "plain 
members and citizens" of the earth as Aldo 
Leopold succinctly declared in his idea of a 
land cthic.5 
Table ll. DEEP ECOLOGY AS AN ALTER..'{ATIVE 
WORLD VIEW 
DOHINAHT WORLDVIBW 
Dominance over nature 
Natural environment as a 
resource for human equality 
Material/economic growth 
material 
for growing human population 
Belief in ample resource 
reserves 






Harmony with nature 
All nature has intrinsic 
worth/biospecies 
Elegantly simple 
needs: Material goals 
serving the larger goal 
of self realization 







!from: Sessions, George and Bill Devall, Deep 
Ecology !Layton, UT: Gibbs M. Smith Inc., 1985), 
p. 69.) 
John Livingston maintains that it is 
natural to be anthropomorphic, and that there 
is no other way to be. We are human so we can 
on ly see the world from a human viewpoint. 
Livingston goes on to say that just as we 
anthropomorphize dogs, dogs "canimorphizc" 
huma ns, and so on. I know my dogs definitely 
act as if I am part of their pack, and under 
their immediate care. Perhaps it's part of a 
natural caring process to relate the world of 
others (whoever they may be) to your own 
experience of the world. 
Anthropomorphism is a specific fact 
which the dominant worldview finds trouble-
some. Humans in Western society tend to 
dominate 'and be separate from animals, and 
yet we persist in attributing human character-
istics to them at the same time. TheoreticaJiy, 
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the dominant paradigm and anthropomorphism 
should be mutually exclusive, but they are not. 
According to Hans Jonas, "Any problem is 
essentially the collision between a comprehen-
sive view (be it hypoth esis or belief) and a 
particular fact which will not fit into it."6 The 
problem I am defi n ing is the collision between 
the unchallenged anthropocentric world-view 
and the enduring fact of anthropomorphism 
which it denies. 
In the course of defining the scope of this 
problem I looked to others who have disagreed 
with the "comprehensive view" which sees 
humans as t he centre of the world. Erazim 
Kohak advocates a philosophy of personalism, 
in which humans are continuous with nature. 
He eloquently asks: 
Shall we conceive of the world around 
us and of ourselves in it as personal, 
a meaningful whole, honoring its order 
as continuous with the mora/law of our 
own being and its being as continuous 
with ours, bearing its goodness -- or 
shall we conceive of it and treat it, 
together with ourselves. as impersonal. 
a chance aggregate of matter propelled 
by a blind force and exhibiting at most 
the ontological/y random lawlike 
regularities of a causal order? Is the 
Person or is matter in motion the root 
metaphor of thought and practice?7 
For Kohak a "person" is not limited to 
humans, it is "a being who stands in a moral 
relation to us, a being we encounter as a 
Thou."8 Therefore his philosophy of p.ersonalism 
incorporates the non-human as well as the 
human. The idea of relating to non-humans as 
"subjects" or "thous" is beautifully expressed by 
Evernden in The Natural Alien, in which he 
advocates "regarding ourselves less as objects 
than as sets of relationships, or as processes in 
time rather than as static forms." 9 
Elaborating this idea, (with insights from 
Merleau-Ponty), Evernden says, "If we were to 
regard ourselves as 'fields of care' rather than 
as discrete objects in a neutral environment, 
our understanding of our relationship to the 
world might be fundamentally transformed."10 
This idea of understanding ourselves as "fields 
of care" is nothing short of a new metaphysical 
approach to the hu ma n / non-human relationship. 
We a re not merely unique individuals all 
bundled up in our own needs and feelings. Our 
very selves extend beyond our bodies, to the 
beings, human and non-human, to whom we are 
Heidegger's reply is that man does 
not look out upon an external world 
through windows. from the isolation 
of his ego: he is already out-of-
doors. He is in the world because. 
existing he is involved in it totally. 
... Afy Being is not something that 
takes place inside my skin ... my 
Being, rather, is spread over a field 
or region which is the world of its 
care and concern.11 
In more recent work Evernden suggests 
a differentiation between "nature-as-object," 
"nature-as-self" and "nature-as-miracle." Nature-
as-object is "a bare-bones nature with no 
subjectivity and no personal variables at all: 
just stuff."12 These objects of nature may be 
as precious as pearls, as highly useful as oil, or 
as common as dandelions but they are still just 
objects, just "stuff." 
Nature-as-self incorporates the earlier 
idea of seeing ourselves as "fields of care" and. 
thus nature is an extended part of ourselves. 
Nature-as-self may also imply "an extension of 
self -hood to nature -- an understanding of 
nature as 'like-self' or as a community of selves, 
of persons, with whom one has relationships 
similar to those within human society."13 This 
classification can pose potential problems if 
your self -image is a destructive one and you 
treat others as "like-self."14 
Nature-as-miracle is more difficult to 
define, mainly because we don't generally 
believe in miracles anymore. I understand 
nature as miracle to refer to the wondrous, the 
inexplicable and unpredictable in nature. This 
of course flies in the face of mainstream 
modern science which is predicated on the 
predictability of nature, and our belief in the 
"laws" of nature. Loren Eiseley defines a 
"miracle" as "an event transcending the known 
laws of nature." He continues: 
Since ... the laws of nature have 
a wa)' of being altered from one 
generation of scientists to the next, 
a lillie taste for the miraculous in 
this broad sense will do us no harm. 
We forget that nature icself is one 
vast miracle transcending the reality 
of night and nothingness. We forget 
that each one of us in his personal 
life repeats that miracle. 15 
connected. beg 
These three conceptualizations of nature 
three different types of questions. 
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Evernden writes, "The question one asks of 
nature-as-object is 'what's in it for me?"' Once 
answered this question leaves us free to concern 
ourselves only with how we will use nature to 
serve our own ends, the hallmark of our techno-
centred culture. "[W]hereas of nature-as-self one 
might ask 'what is it to me?'" which "implies a 
concern with the relationship of humans and 
non-humans." Finally, nature-as-miracle "does 
not prompt questions of control or even 
questions of kinship" instead it asks "'what is 
it?' -- a metaphysical question rather than an 
economic or a political one."16 If Evernden and 
Livingston are correct in their belief that our 
environmental crisis is a metaphysical crisis, 
perhaps this is the only question with which we 
need concern ourselves. 
It would seem that the way in which we 
understand our relationship to nature affects 
both the type of anthropomorphism we practice, 
and our behaviour in decision-making situations 
involving ourselves and nature. And this 
"understanding of nature which we take as 
obvious is in fact a rather complex and abstract 
one which we acquire in a lengthy cultural 
exercise in indoctrina tion."17 
Morris Berman's concept of "participating 
consciousness" or "mimesis" also flies in the face 
of the dominant worldview by proclaiming the 
importance of "the state of consciousness in 
which the subject/object dichotomy breaks down 
and the person feels identified with what he or 
she is perceiving."18 The kind of anthropomor-
phism I am calling attention to is only 
understandable in the context of concepts such 
as "participatory consciousness," "fields of care" 
and "personalism." This type of an thropomor-
phism entails a spontaneous identification with 
other life. Spontaneous because it is without 
effort or premeditation, and it is a form of 
identification because there is envelopment of 
another into oneself. 
Arne Naess explains this process of 
spontaneous identification when he says: 
We tend to see ourselves in everything 
alive. As scientists we observe the death 
struggle of an insect, but as mature 
human beings we spontaneously also 
experience our own death in a way, and 
feel sentiments that relate to struggle, 
pain, and death. 19 
This spontaneous identification is a pre-
cursor to the types of anthropomorphism t hat 
see nature as self or nature as miracle, as 
opposed to t he dominant mode of seeing nature 
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as object. Spontaneous identification is not an 
abstract, psychological process irrelevant to the 
environmental movement. Naess argues that the 
identification process is the most important in 
making "intense personal appreciation of 
diversity of life forms and the whole ecosphere 
possi ble."20 
To make this goal more easily digestible 
Naess points out that, "There is nothing unduly 
romantic or poetic here. Given our biological 
endowment each of us has the capacity to 
identify with all living beings," and "the capac-
ity of experiencing the intimate relations 
between organisms and the nonorganic world." 21 
These ideas of being in relationship and 
in the world, coupled with the emphasis the 
different authors placed on values and morals 
led me to Carol Gilligan's work on moral 
development.22 Moral systems have developed 
as a part of our "connectedness" to other 
humans, but they have not, and may never, 
fully develop with respect to other life-forms. 
In spite of this, Gilligan's "ethic of care" theory 
has a great deal to offer the environmental 
movement. The idea of an "ethic of care" 
resonates with similarities to Evernden's "fields 
of self" and Heidegger's "Being in the world." 
Although they are all from very different disci-
plines, each of them offers a significant chal-
lenge to the dominant worldview in which 
anthropomorphism is imbedded. 
Gilligan's work challenges and comple-
ments the work of Lawrence Kohlberg whose 
long-standing theory of moral development was 
originally based on a biased sample of 84 boys. 
He equates morality with the ability to reason 
and to be just; consequently, Gilligan refers to 
his theory as an "ethic of justice." Gilligan's 
thesis is tha t by leaving out the female voice, 
the different or other voice, and the accom-
panying "ethic of care," we arrive at an incom-
plete picture of human development: "half of 
the dialectic is currentli' missing from most 
psychological accounts."2 Half of the logical 
argumentation necessary to paint a picture of 
human development is absent. Table III 
summarizes and juxtaposes some of the charac-
teristics of these two constructs of moral 
development. I believe it is important to 
understand these theories in order to locate the 
problem of anthropomorphism in our culture. 
In the past decade there has been an 
increasingly loud and anxious 'ry for a biocen-
tric environmental ethic as an alternative to 
the ruling anthropocentric ethic. The idea of 
an environmental ethic has always appeared 
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problematic. Ethics and morals are reached by 
rational dialogue among community members. 
This implies that we would have to confer with 
other life for ms and decide together on a 
certain, reciprocal system of values. I strongly 
suspect other life forms would have no idea, nor 
interest, in what we are talking about. It would 
seem that humans are the only animals that 
need a system of morals to deal with their 
existence. Most other animals just are. 
Table III: SUMMARY OF THE MORAL DIALECTIC 
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Livingston equates our need to be moral 
with the fact that we must live with unnatural 
population densities, and in a state of unceas-
ing stress. He speaks of our moral systems as 
"prosthetic devices" and states: "To extend 
concepts of rights in to nature ... would be to 
export and legitimate a patholo~ical obsession 
with hierarchical relationships." 4 To extend 
only an "ethic of justice" into nature would be 
disastrous but if we were to extend an "ethic 
of care" balanced by an "ethic of justice" the 
vision would be a much more hopeful one. 
Gilligan asserts: 
These disparate visions [an ethic of 
care and an ethic of justice] in 
their tension reflect the paradoxical 
truths of human experience -- that 
we know ourselves as separate only 
insofar as we live in connection with 
others. and that we experience 
relationship only insofar as we 
differentiate other from selj.25 
This is what anthropomorphism is. We 
know ourselves as human, only insofar as we 
live in connection with, and experience non-
humans. We also know ourselves as individuals 
only if we are able to compare and differen-
tiate ourselves from other humans and non-
humans. 
In a thoughtful essay entitled "Life, 
Death,and the Body in the Theory of Being," 
Hans Jonas states: "When man first began to 
interpret the nature of things --and he did this 
when he began to be man -- life was to him 
everywhere, and being the same as being alive." 
Much later the Renaissance ushered in "Modern 
Thought" which decreed that reality could only 
be discovered "through abstention from 
projecting into its image our own felt aliveness. 
In the process the ban on anthropomorphism was 
extended to zoomorphism in genera1." 26 
Jonas traces the curse on anthropomor-
phism to the historical development of dualism 
-- the rendering of matter (body) and spirit 
(mind) .into two separate spheres. This in turn 
led to the two extremes: modern materialism 
and modern idealism, respectively. Jonas says 
that a "fundamental assumption of modern 
metaphysics in the interest of science is that 
there is a basic difference of being between the 
nature of man and the nature of the universe." 
Descartes' principle that "exterior reality ... [is) 
entirely detached from the interior reality of 
thought" exemplifies this assumption. In order 
to know this exterior reality vision became the 
primary mode of perception and brought with 
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it its own biases, as Jonas observes: 
This dominance of "distancing" and 
objectifying perception concurred with 
the dualistic rift between subject and 
object ... in putting a severe ban on 
any transference of features of internal 
experience into the interpretation of the 
external world ... Anthropomorphism 
at all events. and even zoomorphism in 
general. became scientific high 
treason. 27 
Dualism denies human continuity with 
nature, and does not allow the attribution of 
any internal, human experiences to our under-
standing of the external world -- the world 
outside ourselves. In this interpretation anthro-
pomorphism becomes just another case of 
misguided projection. The verb "to project" 
means to "regard something within the mind, 
(as a feeling, thought or attitude) as havin~ 
some form of reality outside the mind."2 
Projection assumes we are not supposed to be 
in any way extended into our environment, and 
it reinforces a distinct separation between the 
self and other, the human and non-human. 
And, as stated earlier, we know ourselves as 
separate and human, only insofar as we know 
ourselves connected together with other life 
forms. 
The following argument historically traces 
the course of anthropomorphism in modern 
thought, and points out the inevitability of 
anthropomorphism as a fact of being. Western 
science from its birth rejected the notion of 
teleology and final causes, as part of its rejec-
tion of Aristotelianism.29 Teleology is defined 
in vitalist philosophy as the doctrine that 
phenomena are guided not only by mechanical 
forces but that they also move towards the goals 
of self- realization. Final causes refers to 
Aristotle's belief that a thing or being has a 
reason for existence, a purpose. (Note that 
evolutionary biology and ecology also believe 
this). 
Hans Jonas shows that the rejection of 
Aristotle's beliefs occurred without any evidence 
that final causes didn't exist in nature. In fact 
science rejected the idea of even searching for 
final causes: "The mere search for them was 
quite suddenly, with the inauguration of modern 
science, held to be at variance with the scien-
tific attitude, deflectin& the searcher from the 
quest for true causes."8 So if life is merely a 
conglomeration of unrelated matter and has no 
reason for existence except to be propelled by 
mechanical forces, it is no wonder anthropomor-
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phism is forbidden. To be anthropomorphic and 
ascribe the feeling of exuberance to a singing 
chickadee definitely contradicts a solely 
mechanical interpretation of the chickadee's 
vocal apparatus. 
Modern science has had to wage war 
against the notion of final causes and against 
anthropomorphism, in order to salvage itself. 
As Jonas confirms: "Thus the struggle against 
teleology is a stage in the struggle against 
anthropomorphism which by itself is as old as 
Western Science."31 What an odd predicament 
to put humans in. Tf anthropomorphism is 
unscientific, and should be denied, humans 
would have to deny their own subjective 
experience. Simplified, it is the traditional 
argument that objectivity truly exists. Quantum 
mecha nics and Heisenberg's Uncertainty 
Principle have already shown us that there is 
no such thing as an objective observer. "What 
we observe, said Heisenberg, is not nature in 
itself but nature exposed to our method of 
question ing."32 
Dar\\ in's theorv of evolution and its 
acceptance in the worid of today also adds to 
the accumulated proof that humans and nature 
are inseparable. Consequently, "the case against 
anthropomorphism in its extreme form becomes 
problematical and is on principle reopened," 
leaving us two alternatives. We can either: ''take 
the presence of purposive inwardness" in 
humans as valid affirmation of the universal 
relatedness of life forms or we can "extend the 
prerogatives of mechanical matter to the very 
heart of the seemingly heterogeneous class of 
phenomena and oust teleology even from the 
'nature of man', whence it had tainted the 
'nature of the universe' -- that is, to alienate 
man from himself and deny genuineness to the 
self-experience of life."38 
Jonas has obviously reflected at great 
length on the position and meaning of anthro-
pomorphism in the web of knowledge that 
constitutes our culture. Basically, he is saying 
that the denial of anthropomorphism is un-
tenable, unless you want to alienate humans 
from their experience of life. Humans, along 
with the rest of nature have a "purposive 
inwardness." and if unencumbered thev will 
move towards their purpose, their goals o.f self-
realization. In a later essay he states: "there is 
no organism without teleology~ there is no 
teleology without inwardncc;s: and: life can be 
known only by life."34 A·Hhropomorphism is a 
way for life (humans) to know life (non-
humans). 
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If one agrees with the philosophical stances 
of Gilligan's "ethic of care," Evernden's "fie lds 
of self," and Jonas' "purposive inwardness," it is 
impossible to deny anthropomorphism. 
Anthropomorphism stands as an example of the 
realization that we are an integral and 
continuous part of the living world: bodily, 
emotionally and mentally. 
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The Nature of Story 
As oral and written record reflects, throughout 
history humankind has vacillated between 
acknowledging its kinship with the natural 
world and denying it. A great deal of human 
culture has consisted of stories concerning 
animals, though modern literature has relegated 
animals, as a subject of imaginative writing, to 
children's fiction. One would be hard pressed 
to name many great works of the past two 
centuries which include animals as the focus of 
the narrative. The old animal stories, however, 
took place in a time and realm when humans 
and animals were able to communicate and these 
narratives constituted the mainstay of oral 
storytelling. This kind of story is an element of 
the "Golden Age" theme and refers to a time 
when the world was a harmonious place where 
people were happy, blessed and "without evil in 
their hearts." These stories of an ancient and 
oral character spoke of our place alongside the 
other animals. 
John Berger, in his essay "Why Look at 
Animals?" says animals first entered the human 
imagination as messengers and promises1. 
Animals were many things to early human 
cultures, moving together with humanity at the 
centre of the world: 
... the choice of a given species as 
magical, tameable and alimentary was 
originally determined by the habits, 
proximity and "invitation" of the animal 
in question.2 
Berger suggests animals were the first metaphors 
as there is "a universal use of animal si~ns for 
charting the experience of the world" -- an 
experience which is largely lost or reduced in 
meaning in modern times. Everywhere in myth 
and folklore, animals offer explanations for the 
world -- "they lent their names or characters to 
a quality, which like all qualities, was, in its 
essence, mysterious."4 Modern science has gone 
far in robbing other life forms of their mystery 
and ambiguity. Once we feel that we know 
everything we want to know about something, 
it often is dismissed from our imaginations and 
resides there in some form unrecognizable to 
* 
. .. by Lon Scheffel 
itself. Animals have become the objects of our 
ever increasing stockpile of knowledge about an 
objectified world. The more we think we know 
of them the further removed they become 
physically, intellectually and spiritually from us. 
Animals cease to be the mysterious gifts of a 
divine creator or even challenging puzzles for 
the scientist. After all, through popular culture 
or the "wonders" of bioengineering, we are able 
to create whatever imaginary and actual animals 
we wish. 
Traditional narratives gave animals a voice 
whereby they could communicate with humans 
and this made the distance between us seem less. 
The influence of scientific method has led us to 
dismiss such stories as naive, anthropomorphic 
imaginings suitable (perhaps) for the entertain-
ment of children. We have silenced other life 
so completely that: 
. .. its silence. guarantees its distance, 
its distinctiveness , its exclusion, from 
and of man. 5 
The traditions of earlier ages which mediated 
between humanity and the rest of nature have 
become like so much quaint and superfluous 
bric-a-brac gathering dust on the shelves of the 
Western imagination. But perhaps we are at 
last beginning to reconsider the value of our 
narrative heritage. Interestingly, oral storytel-
ling is being "rediscovered" as an important 
means of communication, and of making 
connections with our past and with ourselves. 
We cannot plainly see but we sense the hidden 
value in traditional stories and that they might 
help to restore certain things to the creative 
human experience. 
Literature6 and other records of the 
hpman imagination are valuable for searching 
out human perceptions of the world. Literature 
can and does encompass all of life's stories. In 
The Comedy of Survival, a work which 
delineates correspondences between literature 
and ecology, Joseph Meeker describes that 
ability of literature to influence our lives: 
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Literature expresses deep human 
needs and represents the forms of 
behaviour peculiar to a conscious-
ness-bearing animal. It is not 
primarily a medium of communica-
tion or an educational instrument 
for perpetuating certain kinds of 
behaviour but it is often treated as 
if it were both . ... Consciously and 
unconsciously. people imitate literary 
characters and often try to create 
in their own lives the circumstances 
depicted in literature or the 
motivations which produce its events. 
Literature which provides models of 
man's relationships with nature will 
thus influence man's perceptions of 
nature and his responses to it.1 
Literature can have explicit intentions of 
didacticism such as those found in proverbs, 
parables and fables -- all genres which have a 
particular moral to convey which is meant to 
guide our conduct in the world. The figures 
are often merely ciphers and the message leaves 
little work for the imagination. As an example 
of this type consider Caxton's Christianized 
version of Aesop's fable, "Of the Bee and of 
Jupiter": 
Now the evil which men wish 
to others comes to him which wishes 
it. as it appears by this fable of a 
bee which offered and gave to 
Jupiter a piece of honey. 
And then Jupiter said to the 
bee, Demand of me what thou wilt 
and I shall grant it to thee. And 
then the bee prayed him, God 
almighty, grant that whosoever shall 
come for to take away my honey, 
if I prick him he may suddenly die. 
And because Jupiter loved 
humankind he said to the bee, 
Suffice that whosoever shall go to take 
thy honey, if thou prick or sting him, 
immediately thou shalt die. And thus 
her prayer was turned to her own great 
harm. For men ought not to demand of 
God but such things that are good and 
honest.8 
But perhaps we are more affected by the 
implicit messages which may lie deep in a 
narrative or which are created by the individ-
ual's experience being brought to bear on the 
story. Compare the above fable with this one 
of the Winnebago Indians: 
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The Animals Gave Freely of Their 
Medicine 
A man was going to die. 
He went to the top of a hill and lay 
down. 
Briefly he slept. 
When he awoke there was a circle of 
animals. 
Each animal gave the man his own 
personal 
Medicine. 
Raven said -- e-he-a! e-he-a! 
Then he spit on the man and gave of his 
own 
Medicine. 
The man felt better. 
Turtle said -- ahi! ahi! ahi! 
Then he gave the man of his own boiled 
Medicine. 
The man felt better. 
Black Hawk said nothing. 
He gave the man of his medicine right 
on the place 
Where the man hurt the most. 
The man felt much better. 
Then all the animals said --
"Human, in a similar way , 
You will cure your fellowmen!" 
And the man was given the Flutes of 
Power. 
And he became a great Healer, a 
powerful 
Medicine Man and it was because the 
animals 
Gave freely of their medicine.9 
This piece speaks to us of a very different 
understanding of the meaning and motivation 
of non-human beings than does the classical 
fable and seems, in the end, to be a richer 
lesson. Literature, however, cannot assume a 
universal reader and so a singular interpretation 
of a work can never really emerge in a general 
audience.. There is no common external reality 
which we all share so it is difficult to evaluate 
or predict the ability of literature to affect our 
values or emotions yet it still might serve to 
suggest the values of the culture that produced 
the story. 
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Literature has been a major source of 
models used to perpetuate our past, 10 that is, in 
literature we are given evidence of the 
mediating metaphors (viz. conscious or uncon-
scious allegories or symbol systems) which 
people used to explain the world, such as the 
organic cosmological model of the Middle Ages 
or the mechanical model of the Renaissance 
period. We learn from literary depictions of 
cultural models by positing questions 
discerning relatedness among world, self and 
"text," whatever form that text may be in, and 
we test the usefulness of these models by 
applying them to our own social context and 
perceiving the effectY Through this process 
we arc educated by our culture about what sorts 
of participation might be expected of us: 
Education acquaints each new 
lzuman generation with the models 
of life and thought a~·ailable from 
previous generations. A crisis of 
consciousness occurs when there is 
a widespread recognition that many 
important models of reality 
inherited from the human past are 
inadequate. irrelevant. or destructive 
when ap;Zied to present circum-
stances. 
The growing realization that humanity has 
become a kind of unnatural blight on the Earth 
has arisen from just such a crisis of con-
sciousness. Our inherited models of human 
superiority, reason and progress are grossly 
overrated and imminently destructive on a 
global level. Somehow, we have the perpet-
uation of them. We cannot endure scientific 
callousness. Humanistic arrogance and com-
placency towards ecological destruction cannot 
be endured if we are to continue to live on this 
planet of such diverse life. We may as a species 
survive in some manner but we may be alone 
here and if alone, we are inevitably doomed. 
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Literature, a ere a tion of cui ture, has had 
a role in turn, in creating culture, and it may 
be able to assume a wondrous shape in becoming 
a tool of social change in our search for a new 
balance with the processes of nature. As 
Meeker points out, we have in our society 
generally regarded artists and philosophers (and 
I might add other types of storytellers to these 
groups) as being exempt from ecological guilt -
-"but strangely, they are largely responsible for 
beginning or perpetuatin~ harmful beliefs and 
attitudes towards nature." 3 The Humanities are 
to be challenged for giving their questionable 
sanction to environmental exploitation but they 
should not be dismissed by environmental 
educators, for therein may a lso lie the tools for 
social change. 
Perhaps the creation of a different, 
ecologically sound literature, that is, literature 
that encourages a positive, balanced human-
nature relationship, can arise from a re-consid-
eration of the value of age-old traditions. The 
historical, myth-related narrative can still speak 
to us even as we move through our modern, 
artificial environments, perhaps because we 
recognize at some level our tenacious connection 
to a real life; we somehow understand the talc's 
message that we arc indeed, nature's animals. 
In Tales From Eternity, Rosemary Haughton 
points to the "folk wisdom" inherent in fairy 
tales and draws meaningful insight from them 
for the modern world in its ecological and 
spiritual state of disquietude: 
[Fairy tales] do not express what any 
particular society considers should 
occur, or even what does occur in 
normal practice. They are about much 
more basic facts of human nature. 
They are telling us what is the case no 
matter how strenuously society tries to 
modify or suppress it. 14 
And the "case" is that "the lord of creation is 
totally dependent on the well-being of his 
vassals, and that to rule the earth means to 
serve it."15 
In the stories and myths of many peoples 
and times, animals are important figures. They 
do not appear to be representing the animal 
world as such -- the fact that they have human 
attributes, motivations and abilities tells us that 
they are not "really" animals. Rather their roles 
are as representatives of the non-conscious and 
non-rational qualities of human life, part of 
which links humans to their animal ancestry. 
In narratives about animals, the animals speak 
to us from that seat of human unconsciousness 
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that conscious reason often pays no attention to 
in its narrower view of the world. The 
abstractions of the animal voices are pointing 
out that there are other equally "real" realities 
of human life besides t hose which reason shows 
us. Haughton explains how important these 
types of tales are, especially for us now: 
It is just because the fairy-tale 
animals are not "proper" animals 
at all, but rather express a human-
ness which we ignore at our peril. 
that they are necessary for us at a 
time when failure to listen to this 
aspect of our humanness has led us 
to despise and misuse the world of 
nature to which we also belong. 
For the openness to experience, the 
humility and the sense of respect 
which is necessary in order to 
appreciate the value of the wise 
animals of the tales is exactly what 
we need if we are to live at peace 
with and within nature, instead of 
ignoring it and arousing its powers 
of revenge. 16 
Our past tende ncy as a species to see in 
the other an imals a sou rce of wisdom, guidance 
a nd grace is remarkable and ind ica ti ve that we 
were not a lways disinclined towards them. 
Child ren also find nature to be intensely 
animate and fasc inating, at least until the adult 
world teaches them that this is inappropriate. 
The polytheistic-like tendency exhibited in folk 
narrative and legend is not confined to cultures 
whose mythologies link vitally the spirits of 
humans and animals, such as that of aboriginal 
peoples of the Americas a nd Africa. The 
folktales of late Medieval Europe, in a culture 
that had a utilitarian and increasingly callous 
attitude towards animals in everyday life, show 
the same array of creatures "who know better 
than the cocksure hero who ignores their advice 
at his own peril."17 The environmental crisis 
itself has shown us what ensues when we fail to 
listen and act with hu mility. However, for a 
long period in our history, humans looked to the 
other species as sources of wisdom or simply as 
teachers of useful skills, and we preserved what 
we learned from them in story. 
Animals have always provided metaphors 
for us to explain and relate human experience. 
When we participate in the use of animal-
inspi red explanations of exper ience we assign 
to non-huma n life human qualities and aspira-
tions. The compendium of animal stories and 
images which we have from ages past testifies 
to a recognition that animals are something like 
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us -- living, exhibiting will and their own forms 
of in telligence and emotion -- yet at the same 
time occupying a different realm of experience 
than that of the h uman. Other species allow us 
a basis for compar ison; we need them to help us 
define ourselves. 
The qua lity which is perhaps most charac-
teristic of animal story is its anthropomorphism 
-- the projection of human meaning onto non-
human life. Anthropomorphizing may be seen 
as an obvious thing for humans to do since the 
only meanings we can create are human ones. 
We have seen that this aspect of the human 
imagination can have positive results in our 
attempt to understand ourselves and our place 
in the world. However, some types of animal 
story (for example, fable and animal epic) are 
so anthropomorphic that the animal figures are 
recognized as thinly disguised humans, and we 
migh t want to be wary of the harm such 
treatmen t might uninten tionally provoke. For 
instance, in some tales innocent beings suffer 
merely because they are "ugly" animals or 
carnivores. The only "ugly" animal that is 
vindicated is the one that is really a trans-
formed human such as the creature of Beauty 
and the Beast or the frog of The Frog Prince. 
Also, animals tend to get typecast negatively in 
some kinds of traditional tales, for example, 
the sly fox, the stupid donkey, the wise owl or 
the evil wolf and we might wonder whether 
such stories might prejudice children against 
wild life if this is the only kind of information 
they receive and their experience with animals 
is limited. 
If we want to tell stories about ourselves 
why is it that we choose to make animals 
deputize for humans? In Animal Land: The 
Creatures of Children's Fiction, Margaret Blount 
suggests this: 
The answer lies perhaps in the way 
people create, and the kind of life they 
would secretly wish to lead. . . . 
Animals are beautiful, innocent, funny, 
strange, and their built-in appeal can be 
used as a half-way stage towards 
comment on the human race.18 
The attractive power of animals and narrative 
is thus taken advantage of in order to convey 
a n often didactic message -- to sugar-coat the 
pill. This attractiveness of t he an imal story 
could be of use still as an educating tool for 
people of a ll ages, as it always has been, but 
perhaps especially now in the context of dis-
cussing contemporary attitudes about nature. 
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Woodcut from Ernst Voullieme's facsimile edition of the German Esopus printed in 1477, reproduced from 
Caxton's Aesop, ed., R.T. Lenaghan, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). 
Traditional stories, such as those col-
lected by the brothers Grimm among the rural 
people of late nineteenth-century Europe or the 
legends of the native people of our country in 
which the world was depicted as an animated 
and magical place, are important to us now, in 
this time when nature and its inhabitants are 
becoming so remote from us. 19 In Tales From 
Eternity, Haughton's message is particularly 
addressed to contemporary Christians who share 
similar obstacles in the world with the youngest 
child in the fairy tales because their approach 
to life seems anomalous to the society in which 
they live. In the familiar pattern of the fairy 
tale, it is the youngest child who is successful 
in the end, often by relating to nature and 
animals as a friend and with an essentially 
ecological perspective, treating all he meets with 
equal respect and courtesy (see The Golden 
Bird, The Poor Miller's Son and his Cat, The 
Two Brothers, The Hut in the Forest -- all tales 
in which good fortune comes to people through 
their kindness to animals). Our environmental 
problems are the result of having approaches 
and pursuits similar to those of the elder 
siblings of the fairy tales who are proud, 
arrogant and scornful of the old, the young, 
the poor, the ugly, and of animals. 
Haughton describes how the traditional 
stories link us to our cultural, historical and 
mythical past while also offering us wisdom 
with which to make decisions about our future: 
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We can use them to orient ourselves 
in the present, and discover which 
way to go. They can help us to do 
this because they link us to our 
Christian past, link the Christian 
past to its pagan pre-history, and 
link it also to its equally "pagan" 
subcultures.2° 
The traditional folk stories have always made 
it clear that humanity must respect other 
animals: 
The would-be hero who ignores the 
needs or advice of animals 
invariably lands in trouble, whereas 
the real hero or heroine has 
compassion pn the trapped bird. or 
listens to the advice of the faithful 
old horse.21 
Animals are often cast in tradi tional 
tales in the roles of helper, guide, prophet and 
friend . These helpers speak not only with the 
voice of instinctive wisdom that our culture has 
come to despise, but also with the voice of 
common sense from the people of the past who 
lived intimately with nature.22 This knowledge 
is required for the hero's success because he or 
she must understand, accept and carry forward 
the work of the past, good or bad. The wisdom 
of the animals is helpful and avai lable for good 
ends only and is intended only for those who 
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will bring love and humility to their task. 
These kinds of stories must not be lost to us 
because they are able to show us how to live a 
more balanced existence with other life if we 
could recognize the way to world health that 
folk sense sometimes points out. Traditional 
tales are often rich with the spirituality and 
ecology of life. In them: 
We shall recognize that we are part of 
creation; we are called out from it, but 
we must not with scorn reject the parts 
of ourselves that we share with the other 
animals and even plants. or try to cut 
the threads that weave us, body and 
soul into the intricate and subtle fabric 
of living things. If we try to detach 
ourselves from all this we destroy 
ourselves, spiritually and physically; that 
is the lesson of modern ecology and of 
tales so old that their origins are often 
untraceable. 23 
We sometimes sense that the animal figure 
of story is us -- both animal and human 
simultaneously -- and is speaking to us from a 
place deep in shared ancestral memory. 
Interestingly, children seem to prefer these 
older, other-worldly tales over the artistic or 
contemporary children's story. 24 The conception 
of the world reflected in the traditional fairy 
tale, for example, is, for better or worse, one of 
specific boundaries concerning goodness and 
justice which perhaps corresponds to the stage 
at which a young child is at in developing his 
or her theories about the world.25 If this is so, 
then perhaps we could make better, critical use 
of these stories in attempting to understand our 
environmental history and in trying to foster an 
appropriate environmental ethic -- but first we 
must somehow restore them to their former 
significance within society. 
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Red Riding Hood by Gustave Dore from French Fairy Tales. 
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Shedding Our Skin, Dropping Leviathan's Armour : 
• 
A Meditation on the Spirit of Disrespect and the Crisis of Civilization 
In the beginning, was 
the seed: 
the cosmic egg. 
by Adrian lvakhiv * 
Beginnings are useful, because they contextualize change. Once upon 
a time, there was changelessness. A point at which the nothing and the All 
were One, but which contained all possibilities. All-potent. All-promising. 
And then, the Big Bang. The Great Beginning. Movement. Dynamism. 
The great un ravelling of energies and of differences, the cosmic dance, 
gushing outwards, issuing forth Force only to integrate inwards again into 
crystallized Form. The out-breath of the universe becoming the in-breath of 
the infinitely many smaller uni verses it gave birth to. 
And then, one day, we enter the myth. Accompanied by Choice. "We" 
here can take as the definition of ourselves those beings that have so altered 
their surroundings that evolved, instinctual relations no longer speak through 
us, and, as a consequence, we are somewhat lost, uncertain as to what we are 
to do. But this lostness reg isters with us only as a vague premonition, and we 
continue as if all were as it shou ld be (though our myths betray us). We sense 
the existence of different possibilities, between which we must choose, or else 
be led blindl y. To help ourselves choose, we posit the existence of Good and 
Evil. 
But hold: rewind . . . Good and Evil arc surely subjective concepts, 
relative, dependent on many t hi ngs. Depending on our questions, the answers 
float somewhere between the poles of a continuum; they make up a 
complementarity, not an irreconcilable dualism. 
Let us propose the Good. Human beings, ourselves and others, living 
in relatively harmonious communities (being social animals) with each other, 
with the biosphere of living beings, with the cosmos around us, in relations 
of mutual respect, respectful of the mysteries and ultimate unknowability of 
the Selfhood of Others, the Mystery of all Other, of Being, of Life. (Is this 
idealism? Of ourse, but without ideals there is no sense of direction or of 
value.) 
Let us then look around ourselves, and observe. It is not so, says the 
world. L ife is not easy; it sometimes seems a burden. We must work to 
survive. Some succeed, others fail. Some succeed at others' expense. 
Humanity succeeds at nature's expense. Humanity learns to dominate its 
world. Some of us learn to dominate others (according to our physical 
abilities, our socia l status, our sexual or racial identities, our economic means); 
we create inst i tutions of domination. Relat ions revolve around manipulation, 
objectification; they are no longer founded on respect, on the acceptance of 
mutual mystery, but are ordered according to their use and value for the 
subject. (We can ask: a m I respectful of the mystery, the sacredness of the 
people I live with and encoun ter in daily affairs? Is a corpora t ion, a state, 
an institution respectful of the mystery and sacredness of those with whom 
it deals, the humans, animals, plants, the biosphere of life, the earth and 
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water and fire and air?) 
Now we have Good and Evil. But Good, as an ideal, is unattainable. 
Bee a use desires contradict. Because respect of another's sacred self hood 
requires one's own vulnerability, one's own sacrifice. The wolf seems to care 
little for the selfhood of the caribou, which run in what appears to be fear 
from their predator. There is apparent conflict, contradiction. Polarity, 
dynamism. A dance of energy, to and fro, with parts feeding off other parts, 
all weaving its own kind of natural logic and beauty. Life and Death. And 
through it all, the continuity of Life. 
The dance can be one of ongoing change, vita lity, exuberance, 
celebration. Or its vitality can become locked up, frozen, institutionalized 
into repetitive patterns of behaviour, such that the identities tighten, close 
in, formalize, become fixed and restrictive, and the selves floundering within 
the identities begin to come apart, to fragment, disassociating that which fits 
their identities from what doesn't. Troubled by their inner confusion, they 
begin to clutch at the straws offered them. The person stops being a deep 
mystery, a conscious human being whose essence is found in the freedom 
between various possibilities, and becomes a Worker, a Boss, a Servant, a 
Slave, a Wife and Mother, a Criminal, a Schizophrenic, a Sinner. And these 
crippling dimensions, crippling because they curb the flowering of the 
person's developmental potentials, are passed on through social and cultural 
institutions, through the canalized locks of repetitive imitation, each 
generation moulding the next in its own image. 
Fredy Perlman, in a torrent of historica l passion entitled Against His-
Story, Against Leviathan\ called this Life-Ordering and Life-Controlling, 
Dominating, Civilizing, Structuring, Power-Wielding force in history 
"Leviathan."2 Leviathan, the Earth Plunderer, the Community Destroyer. I 
will be nice and call Leviathan the Spirit of Disrespect. Of course, this 
hardly does justice to Leviathan's vehemence, when "His" Spirit combines 
with the fanatic's energized, desperate Misunderstanding of Self and World, 
to launch His crusades, His wars, exterminations and genocides. 
The ways of Leviathan disconnect, they close off from experience, 
from the sharing, mutually respectful, mutually vulnerable, commonwealth 
of interpenetrating Selves. They build edifices, fortresses, and bask in their 
own self-proclaimed glory. Their goal is Power, Control , the Domination of 
the Other, and of the World. The Spirit of Disrespect emerges often 
unwittingly, as a response to a worse enemy, as a defense. The virus of 
Power, once unleashed (and, historically, it seems to have emerged as a result 
of ecological "caging" in the Mesopotamian river valleys, in the Nile region, 
the Indus, and elsewhere3) spreads easily. Once it contacts a human 
community, it is difficult to extricate. Defense against an aggressor requires 
the adoption of similar methods. Walls created to keep the enemy out, in 
time, create social institutions for their own maintenance, social levies, profes-
sionaliza tion, bureaucracy. Gradually, the stratified empirc-sta tes spread and 
grow, their tentacles and entrails cannibalizing more and more of the 
humanity in their midst. 
The formerly free members of human communities become Leviathan's 
inmates. "The armour once worn on the outside wraps itself around the 
individual's insides. The mask becomes the individual's face." 4 The once free 
development of humans in communities that cherished the life around them, 
that communicated with their relations ritually, and recognized their place 
within the whole, becomes crippled. Seemingly harmless agriculture, 
domestication, the control of other life forms for our benefit, private 
property, the accumulation of surplus capital, all increase the fear of the 
Other, the fear of the Wild and Untamed, counterpoised against the arrogant 
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Ego. A somatic, emotional, intellectual and psychic rigidity sets in and 
becomes the character armour of individuals, of social institutions, of 
ideologies. Human society becomes schizophrenically disconnected from the 
Biosphere of Life, unable to communicate any more with the shared consensus 
of the living commonwealth around it. It begins to talk only to itself, mainly 
through commands, decrees and proclamations, and eradicates whatever it 
cannot comprehend. 
This is the Evil, the Failure, the Unwholeness in our way about the 
world. But the Good, the Ideal, exists, because in some form its elements 
have been felt and experienced, at one time or another. Sharing, respect, 
love, awe, wonder, felicity, genuine relationships that touch on the immense, 
unfathomable, unbounded depths within and between selves, between friends 
and relations -- these all exist. On rare occasions, we still experience them. 
Perhaps they were once the prevalent state of being, says a voice filtering 
through the noise. The voice speaks of the "original affluent society" of 
gatherer-hunters, where gathering and hunting were not economic chores, but 
were the joyful activities of life interpenetrated by the stories, the celebra-
tions, the rituals, that animated the world and its co-celebrants. Myths tell us, 
with greater persistence, of the "golden age." 
The memory of the Good gives birth to resistance, in various forms, 
against Leviathan's pretensions. But the inmates, maimed and crippled by 
generations of life surrounded and defined by the Spirit of Disrespect, have 
not found it easy to walk away and create the Good from the ground up. 
Their armour doesn't come off. "Segments of the decomposed worm remain 
scattered over the countryside, and each segment tends to recompose itself into 
a complete worm .... The segments are like machines. If they've merely been 
abandoned and haven't rusted too badly, they can be oiled and put back into 
operation by any good mechanic."5 The ways of society, its culture, develop 
over many generations, and likewise, a culture free of Leviathan's 
deformations requires many generations of cultivation. 
Resistance has taken the form of solitary or small group withdrawals, 
of massive rebellions, of carefully planned and strategized revolutions, of 
haphazard and spontaneous upsurges of violent emotion and aggression. The 
attempts at resistance are not the Good fighting the Evil. They are more 
often instinctive reactions, humanity's ecological response against Leviathan's 
repressive order. Some of the reactions are less coherent than others; some 
lead to worse ends than the order they toppled. (Many make the mistake of 
localizing the blame in too small a frame. Marxism generally reduces the 
problem to economics, treating the ethical and ideological as merely the 
"superstructure." Religious and psychological stories tend toward the opposite, 
advocating a personal salvation that expects social transformation to come 
about as a result of changed consciousness, ignoring how the consciousness is 
shaped by institutions. Still others search for scapegoats elsewhere: in 
religion, or in males' inferiority complex that comes about with the realization 
of their marginality in the perpetuation of the species. But these, perhaps 
unfairly, ignore the ecological limitations that ga \ e birth to hierarchy and 
power institutions in the first place.) 
And so the stories of resistance emerge, incomplete as they are, 
alongside and in between all of the stories churned out by the Leviathanic 
organism in its ongoing myth-making enterprise -- its proclamations about 
human "progress," used to justify all the wars and battles, the repression and 
persecution -- all in the name of the "national interest'' or some other social 
god, always demanding allegiance towards the common good, however it be 
defined by Power. 
It has been l_eft to the storytellers and artists and the less visible 
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maintainers of the wisdom tradition, the gnostics of the soul, to continue 
cultivating the Spirit of Reverence in small enclaves, hidden from Leviathan's 
gaze, in individual lives. The prophets (Blake, Thoreau, and the countless 
others) have proclaimed it aloud, occasionally reawakening a memory of it for 
others. 
Today there are not many Leviathans, but one Immensity, whose estate 
has become the whole planet. The tentacles of this many-headed colossus 
stretch into every available, unclaimed space, subjugating and devouring the 
Biosphere in manageable chunks, and defecating out bits and pieces of real 
estate property, statistics on paper, commodities, fashions and fetishes, 
consumer goods and consumers themselves; and behind it all -- the spectre of 
war, the threat of the Enemy, abstracted and projected onto some racial or 
political or religious group against which we must defend ourselves with our 
precious slogans and flags. Leviathan's human form, the Corporate-Industrial 
Class, are all of us, to the extent that we participate in the buying and selling 
of the planet and of our own and others' Being. In the interstices of 
corporate-industrial consciousness, between Leviathan's winding en trails, 1 ives 
and breathes the planetariat, the sparks of free, human Community, Life in 
all its sacredness and mystery mutually affirmed and respected by all its 
constituent beings. 
Stuck as we are on this battlefield between the Divine and the not 
yet conscious, human as we are with a taste of our immense power, homeless 
as we are having long ago broken out of our evolutionary, ceo-geographic 
perimeters, we can safely assume that the battle between the two Spirits will 
continue. Leviathan's grasp has become so all-encompassing that it endangers 
the future of all life. Yet the conditions today arc not those of the past. No 
matter how sharp the incisors with which Leviathan had been extricated from 
a community, there were always fresh, still untouched frontiers for Him to 
wind His way into. Today, those frontiers have diminished; there is no place 
left to run -- not for Leviathan, not for us. With the planetisation of the 
Beast, the bull of His Power can be faced squarely and grasped by its horns. 
Yet His cages are built and will not go away, His armour will persist, and 
again it may be the ecological conditions of the planet's finitude that press 
this armour down onto our bodies, preventing an easy return to the free flow 
of Life. 
For my own sake, I would be happy to express the Good, and to do it 
in the critically multi-dimensional way that makes it dangerous to Leviathan. 
Only a Spirit of Disrespect coherently contributes to its own future, the 
future of Community, Sacredness, and Life. It is by loosening the screws that 
hold Leviathan's armour in place, but loosening them all at once, so that His 
energy cannot relocate in other niches, that takes place the Healing of the 
World .... 
* * • 
A Self-Critical Note on Sources and on Metaphors: 
"Leviathan" and His constituent parts have been analyzed for as long 
as there has been some awareness of there being a problem at all. Modern, 
relatively comprehensive analyses of a socio-political character appear in the 
writings of Andrew Bard Schmookler, Murray Bookchin, Michael Mann, 
Marilyn French, Lewis Mumford, Frederick Turner, Fredy Perlman, and, to 
some extent, in the critical traditions of various "isms" and critical theories 
every good academic knows of. And then there are those of a more 
philosophical character, the spiritual critics of Leviathan, the insightful 
healers of humanity's psychological and spiritual wounds, whose tradition 
extends from well before Lao Tzu to our own century's prophets and soul 
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attendants, those like Carl Jung, Martin Heidegger, G.l. Gurdjieff, Wilhelm 
Reich, Martin Buber, Theodore Roszak, Susan Griffin, Starhawk, Mircea 
Eliade, to name just a few. 
The very need to use language, however, jeopardizes the thoughts of 
anyone wishing to speak of the "Spirit of Disrespect." The use, in this essay, 
of terms such as "Leviathan," "tentacles," "entrails," "the Beast," conjure up a 
particular set of images, a lens of metaphors through which to view the world. 
Their power is somewhat removed from the realities they point toward. 
Language is a medium whose apparent instrumentality pretends to a neutrality 
that doesn't exist; it is forever being used to manipulate emotions and 
responses. My point is not to apologize, but rather to underline my awareness 
of the need for the critical reading of texts. One might ask, for instance, 
need we resort to metaphors such as "tentacles" and "beast" that reflect a fear 
of the worm-like and slimy animal nature that is within us, but that we 
perceive as being other? 
Extreme usage of language tends to divide readers into camps -- those 
familiar with t he usage, and who "agree" with it, arc emotionally empowered 
by it; those unfamiliar with it think it extreme, absurd, or even dangerous. 
The ability to see things from different points of view is made possible by 
a familiarity with different and contrasting descriptions of the world, and it 
is t his flexibil ity in the capacity to describe the world that loosens the grips 
of the "armour" that maintains the world as it is. A metaphor is a way of 
describing the world (and, more dangerously, of constructing our world); we 
must learn to "unglue" ourselves from our metaphors, and for this reason, the 
above mediatation should be seen as an exercise in seeing the world through 
a particular set of lenses, and its validity should be judged by the validity 
and pragmatic usefulness of the lenses it provides. 
Notes 
1 . Fredy Perlman, Against Ilia-Story, Againat Leviathan (Detroit: Black and Red Press, 1983). 
2. Perlman follows, and, at the same time, subverts Thomas Hobbes' notion of "Leviathan." In his work 
entitled, Leviathan, Hobbes discusses "leviathan" aa a positive socializing force, while Perlman considers 
it negative. 
3. See for example, M icheal Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A m.tory of Power from the Beginning 
to A.D. 1760 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
4. Perlman, p. 38. 
5. Ibid., pp. 43-45. 
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Ecology, Witchcraft and the Enchanted World 
Pagans, or more properly neo-pagans have been 
growing in numbers and influence over the past 
decade or so in the U.S. and Canada. This is 
evidenced in the feminist, peace, green (or 
ecology), and anarchist movements. Margot 
Adler, author of Drawing Down the Moon, an 
examination of contemporary neo-paganism, has 
estimated that there are about 100,000 people in 
the U.S. alone who describe themselves as pagan 
or neo-pagan.1 Over the past 5 or 6 years, I 
have developed a strong sympathy, more, an 
empathy with the neo-pagan sensibility and 
earth centredness. Apart from reading 
Dreaming the Dark by Starhawk, I had not 
studied paganism or ritual practice. This 
summer however, both at the North American 
Anarchist Survival Gathering and the North 
American Bioregional Congress the presence of 
pagans was very obvious to me. At the 
Bioregional Congress I had the chance to 
experience paganism directly, through earth-
bonding rituals which had a powerful effect on 
many participants. 
The following essay, presents a particular 
reading of two literary works, The Little Prince 
by Antoine de Saint-Exupery and Not Wanted 
on the Voyage by Timothy Findley. In reading 
these two modern tales it seemed to me that 
each in its own way contains a pagan sensibility 
or, at least, can be interpreted from a pagan 
sensibility to reveal new insights the authors 
may not have been conscious of. The first 
section of the essay attempts to show how a 
discussion of the symbols used in The Little 
Prince, informed by a neo-pagan symbolic 
understanding, can evoke images of a very 
different way of knowing from the dominant 
Western scientific one. The Little Prince is the 
story of a little prince from a tiny planet who 
comes down to earth, after visiting several other 
planets, meets an enigmatic and magical serpent, 
a wise fox, and an adult (the narrator). Through 
his adventures, the Little Prince learns some 
lessons about love, relationships, and adult life. 
In this tale, a pagan understanding of the self 
has resonances with currently developing 
ecological insights of a self which goes beyond 
the boundaries of our skin. The second section 
of the essay, focuses on the character of Lucy 
in Not Wanted on the Voyage. It is the story of 
• 
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the great flood and the first time the world 
ended, the story of Noah's ark. Yet, it's a kind 
of modern magic realism with a mythology of 
its own. Lucy, is Lucifer the rebel male angel 
who comes to earth as a seven foot white-faced 
woman of considerable beauty and charm with 
long, jet-black hair. In both these stories, an ex-
amination from a pagan perspective can 
illuminate imagery and symbolism out of which 
we can draw many lessons. 
As Anton Ehrenzweig states 10 The 
Hidden Order of Art: 
The complexity of any work of art , 
however simple, far outstrips the 
powers of conscious attention. which 
with its pin-point focus can attend 
to only one thing at a time. Only 
the extreme zmdifferentiation of 
unconscious vision can scan these 
complexities. I t can hold them in 
a single, unfocused glance and treat 
figure and ground with equal impar-
tiality .2 
The Little Prince is certainly exemplary of the 
"hidden order of art." However simple in 
appearance or form, the reality dealt with in 
The Little Prince is most difficult to express 
in language, especially for those of us who are 
from a literate, historical, linear, visually 
oriented culture. In The Little Prince what is 
most essential in life is not visible at all. The 
secret of life, the fox tells the Little Prince, the 
essential, is invisible to the eyes. What then is 
this story, apparently written for children, that 
treats of the hidden order of the universe? 
When I first read The Little Prince, it 
was for a literature course given by a Priest at 
Saint Michael's College. For him, the story of 
the Little Prince was a modern tale of the 
Christ, his wanderings and his crucifixion and 
resurrection. 
Art, like life, is open to interpretation 
and The Little Prince presents a number of 
riddles not readily interpreted. I myself don't 
have a clear-cut interpretation of this tale but 
I do see some resemblances to mythology. The 
Mike Carr is a student in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York, focusing on politics, ecology, and environmental 
thought. For the past 18 yeara, he has been an activist in a variety of social movements. 
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earliest legends go back long before Christianity 
of course. In The Spiral Dance, Starhawk 
points out that the legends of Wicca, or 
Witchcraft predate all the so-called great 
religions.3 The cycle of death and re-birth dealt 
with in Christianity and which we will see The 
Little Prince also deals with is certainly a 
subject of a broad range of mythologies. But 
perhaps the symbolisms in The Little Prince 
can be interpreted more satisfactorily from the 
older pagan perspective. Yet The Little Prince 
is clearly a modern tale, set in the 20th century 
with asteroids, airplanes, geographers, business-
men, hunters with guns, and enormous tele-
scopes. Clearly, this story is not a myth, at 
least not a traditional myth. This puzzle can 
be resolved if we consider how myths and tales 
are compared by Mircea Eliade in Myth and 
Rea li ty: 
Though in the West the tale has long 
since become a literature of diversion 
(for children and peasants) or of 
escape (for city dwellers). it still pre-
sents the structure of an infinitely 
serious and responsible adventure. for 
in the last analysis it is reducible to an 
initiatory scenario: again and again we 
find initiatory ordeals.• 
In the case of The Little Prince, the 
ordeals which Eliade speaks of take the form 
of riddles to be solved. The enigmatic be-
haviours of adults, the puzzling behaviour of 
the Prince's rose, and the riddle of "taming" the 
fox are among the many "ordeals" the Prince 
faces. In reflecting on the nature of the tale, 
Eli a de continues: 
Its content proper refers to a terrify-
ingly serious reality: initiation, that is, 
passing by way of a symbolic death and 
resurrection, from ignorance and 
immaturity to the spiritual age of the 
adult.6 
For Eliade, it is not always true that the tale 
shows a desacralization of the mythical world: 
"It would be more correct to speak of a cam-
ouflage of mythical motifs and characters."6 
Of course, in the world of The Little 
Prince, becoming an adult after meeting up with 
a11 the narrow pathetic representatives of the 
adult world -- the narrator excepted -- growing 
up is a very dubious fate. 
I don't know what Saint-Exupery had in 
mind when he wrote T he Litt le Prince. There 
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are many enigmas in this tale: the elephant in 
the boa, the fox who wants to be domesticated, 
the lamplighter, the danger of the baobab trees, 
the mystery of the rose, of the golden cobra, 
and of the Little Prince himself, both so naive 
and so wise. At least some of these enigmas can 
be illuminated through a pagan understanding 
of self. By drawing upon some symbols from 
mythology certain correspondences are suggested 
which evoke a different epistemology, an 
epistemology which has a fundamental 
ecological meaning. There are many elements 
of early mythology in The Little Prince. The 
Prince himself has magic powers not the least 
of which is his ability to "dream" into existence 
the village we11 in the desert, or his ability to 
read the narrator's mind. In this tale animals 
talk, as well as flowers, just as in mythology. 
The story opens with the drawing of a 
coiled serpent. In The Women's Encyclopedia 
of Myths and Secrets by Barbara Walker, the 
serpent which sheds its skin periodically is 
symbolic of the cycle of death and rebirth.7 
In this metaphor, snakes don't die of old age 
but in shedding their skins they are continually 
being reborn into a new life. The serpent is 
identified with the goddess, the life force 
constantly re-newing life through the cycles of 
birth and death. For Eliade, myth, "an ex-
tremely complex cultural reality ... can be 
approached and interpreted from various and 
complementary viewpoints."8 In his appendix 
Eliade comments: 
The tale takes up and continues 
"initiation" on the level of the 
imaginary. If it represents an 
amusement or an escape, it does so 
only for the bmralized consciousness, 
and particularly for that of modern 
man . ... Today we are beginning 
to realize that what is called 
"initiation" co-exists with the human 
condition, that every existence is 
made up of an unbroken series of 
"ordeals." "deaths." and "res-
urrection," whatever be the terms 
that modem language uses to 
express these originally religious 
experiences.9 
Eliade's discussion of initiation resonates 
with Paul Shepard's reflections on initiation in 
pre-historic societies. For Shepard, initiation 
in these societies symbolizes passage from one 
stage of life to another, and actually helps to 
achieve the transition. Shepard suggests in his 
book, Nature and Madness, that Western society 
is "sick" because it has rigidified at the juvenile 
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stage in development, failing to provide the 
nurturing which will help adolescents into the 
more mature stage of bonding with nature, and 
of being at home in the wor ld.10 
Drawing from the Fairy Tradition of 
Witchcraft, Starhawk explains in The Spira) 
Dance that the unconscious mind is called the 
"Younger Self"; the conscious mind is called 
"Talking Self." Because they function through 
different "modes of awareness," that is they 
have different epistemologies, communication 
between the two is very difficult. 
The Younger Self directly experiences the 
world through images, emotions, sensations, 
dreams, vtswns, and physical symptoms. 
Starhawk says Younger Self corresponds roughly 
to Jung's personal and collective unconscious. 
Younger Self's verbal understanding is limited. 
Talking Self organizes the impressions of 
Younger Self, gives them names, and classifies 
them into systems. Talking Self speaks through 
words, abstract concepts, and numbers. Younger 
Self corresponds to the "child," Talking Self to 
the "adult" or "parent" in the tale of The Little 
Prince. The Little Prince himself is the child, a 
magical child whose way of knowing is so 
different from the adult world. The parent is 
the narrator, the adult who helps the Little 
Prince understand the weird wor,ld of adults. 
This is one level of understanding of The Little 
Prince, but there is another deeper one.In the 
Fairy Tradition, a third "self" is recognized, 
what Starhawk calls the "High Self" or "God 
Self," "the ultimate and original essence, the 
spirit that exists beyond time, space, and 
rna tter."11 In the Fairy Tradition, this "self" is 
our deepest level of wisdom and compassion. 
The High Self often appears as the "Spirit 
Guid.". Sometimes the Spirit Guide appears in 
dual form. Starhawk relates John C. Lilly's 
account of his L.S.D. experience in an isolation 
tank where he reports meeting two helpful 
beings: 
They say that they are my guardians, 
that they have been with me before at 
critical times and that in fact they are 
with me always, but I am not usually in 
a state to perceive them. I am in a 
state to perceive them when I am close 
to the death of the body. In this state 
there is no time. There is an immediate 
perception of the past, present, and 
future as if in the present moment. 12 
Starhawk then comments that the High Self is 
connected to the Younger Self, but that the 
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conscious mind with its abstract concepts, its 
numbers, the Talking Self never actually com-
municates with the Divine, the Higher Self. To 
do this we have to resort to symbols, art, poetry, 
music, myth, and the actions of ritual. 
Ritual is actually only mentioned once 
in The Little Prince. Significantly though it is 
the fox -- the character who reveals the secret 
of life -- that says ritual is necessary and that 
it has been too much forgotten. The Little 
Prince himself does not know what ritual is 
and the fox's explanation is not very elaborate. 
From the story though, it's clear that ritual does 
involve time, dance, and a break from ordinary 
life. For Eliade, by living the myths through 
ritual, "one emerges from profane, chronological 
time, and enters a time that is of a different 
quality, a 'sacred' time at once primordial and 
infinitely recoverable."13 
In The Little Prince the break from 
ordinary time that the fox describes can be 
interpreted as that "sacred time" in which we 
connect with our high self. Starha wk, in con-
sidering ritua l for moderns warns: 
Aspects of Witchcraft rituals may 
sometimes seem silly to very serious-
minded people, who fail to realize 
that ritual is aimed at Younger Self. 
The sense of humour. of play, is 
often the key to opening the deepest 
states of consciousness. Part of tlte 
"price of freedom," then, is the 
willingness to play. to let go of our 
adult dignity, to look foolish, to 
laugh at nothing. A child make-
-believes that she is a queen. her 
chair becomes a throne. A witch 
make-believes that her wand has 
magic power, and it becomes a 
channel for energy_l'' 
All the above descriptions, John Lilly's, 
Mircea Eliade's, Starhawk's, and Saint-Exupery's 
are attempts to explain to Talking Self or 
linear-logical modern man what in the last 
analysis can never really be explained in terms 
of Cartesian reductionism, namely, that what 
is most real, most vital for human life on earth , 
can never really be explained on the level of 
ordinary reality. It is i n fact another way of 
knowing reality, an epistemology of the 
enchanted world, an epistemology of the heart. 
From such a reading of The Little Prince, we 
can understand that an epistemology of the 
heart leads us into the enchanted world of 
relationship where everything is interconnected. 
This is the world of the High Self. 
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The High Self or Divine self is very much 
analogous to "deep ecology" perspectives of the 
extended self, the self which includes an ever 
widening sphere of beings and natural processes, 
the self which bonds to the biosphere and 
ultimately beyond it to the cosmos. We identify 
with other species in our enchanted world 
because in this sense they and we are connected 
ecologically. Their home is our home, we are 
related, connected. As Starhawk says: 
Love for life in all its forms is the 
basic ethic of Witchcraft. Witches are 
bound to honour and respect all living 
things, and to serve the life force ... 
oneness is attained not through losing 
the self, but through realizing it fully. 
Honour the Goddess in yourself, 
celebrate your self, and you will see 
that Self is everywhere.15 
In the Fairy tradition of Starhawk, the 
High Self is often symbolized as two linked 
spirals, or as the infinity sign. It is the sign 
of a fully realized being, one who has attained, 
experienced and realized the wisdom of the 
ancients. 
In Timothy Findley's Not Wanted on the 
Voyage this kind of realized being is repre-
sented by the character of Lucy. Like the 
Goddess symbol in Wicca, Lucy includes both 
male and female aspects. For Starhawk, "the 
femaleness of the Goddess is primary, not to 
denigrate the male, but because it represents 
bringin}f; life into the world, va luing the 
world." It is clear that Lucy values the world. 
Her purpose in joining the human race is both 
to "survive the holocaust in-heaven and to 
prevent the holocaust on earth."17 
Not Wanted on the Voyage is not an openly 
"pagan" novel. Like The Little Prince, its 
paganism (if such it is) is hidden. Even though 
Lucy tells Mrs. Noyes (a t the end of book three) 
that she, Mrs. Noyes, is beginning to understand 
the meaning of her sign "infinity," this is the 
closest we get to an explicit explanation of the 
sign. However, we do know that Lucy/Lucifer, 
the bearer of light, was intolerant of heaven 
because there was only light "merciless light," no 
shadows, no storms, no rain. Neither does Lucy 
support the opposite situation where there is 
only rain, no sun. She dreams of a world 
"where darkness and light arc reconciled."18 
Lucy values diversity, diversity in all things, 
light and dark being symbols of course of good 
and evil. Lucy knows that real evil is a place 
where opposites don't exist, a place like heaven 
Undercurrents 36 
where "a person's clothes were always at the 
cleaners, being improved, or else, the person was 
always at the cleaners, being improved."19 
Lucy's desire to reconcile light and dark is 
essentially a pagan sensibility. In The Spiral 
Dance, Starhawk writes of the "wheel of the 
year" with its waxing and waning of light and 
dark: 
... the Dark and Light Twins are 
clearly understood to be aspects of 
the same divinity. But when we see 
the God as split, we run the risk of 
suffering a split within ourselves: 
of identifying totally with the Light 
and ascribing the Dark to an agent 
of evil . ... In Witchcraft, the dark 
waning aspect of God is not evil --
it is a vital part of the natural 
cycle.20 
Lucy's sexuality is representative of this 
pagan sensibility. Lucy's female aspect contains 
within it a male aspect. In Wicca, male and 
female forces represent difference, but not in 
essence. Starhawk says: 
They are the same force flowing in 
opposite. but not opposed directions. 
The Chinese concept of Yin and 
Yang is somewhat similar. but in 
Witchcraft the description of the 
forces is very different - Neither is 
"active" or "passive," dark or light. 
dry or moist- instead, each partakes 
of all these qualities. The female 
is seen as the life-giving force. the 
power of manifestation, of energy 
flowing i1lto the world to become 
form. The male is seen as the death 
force, in a positive not a negative 
sense: the force of limitation that 
is the necessary balance to unbridled 
creation, the force of dissolution, of 
return to formlessness. Each prin-
ciple contains the other: Life 
breeds death, feeds on death; death 
sustains life, makes possible 
evolution and new creation. They 
are pare of a cycle. each dependent 
on the other. 21 
Lucy herself goes through several "shed-
dings of skin" in the course of "the voyage," 
perhaps symbolic of the Wiccan perspective of 
the universe as fields of energy, vortexes of 
moving forces, currents in an ever changing 
sea, congealing temporarily into forms, only to 
dissolve and coalesce again into new forms. 
Lucy can be seen then as a representation of a 
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pagan concept of self, an extended mature self 
having undergone many transformations 
throughout her long struggle against the forces 
of evil in heaven which are "under the protec-
tion of Michael Archangelis." 22 
In a discussion on the spiritual self, Harold 
Wood refers to the pantheistic concept of the 
"ecological self" in which one's personal self 
becomes identified with the ecological self or 
ultimate being.23 This is also referred to as 
"extended identity," a basic principle of pan-
theism. Regardless of the differences between 
pantheism and paganism, this concept of self 
is very similar to tht extended self concept in 
paganism (and in deep ecology). 
The mature being, a being for whom being 
matters in all its diverse forms will naturally be 
opposed to absolutism. As we have seen, this is 
the crux of Lucy's fight against the evil of 
absolutist heaven and of its chief representative 
on earth the patriarch Dr. Noah Noyes. As 
Starhawk says in The Spiral Dance: 
The Judeo-Christian heritage has left 
us with the view of a universe composed 
of warring opposites. which are valued 
as either good or e\·il. . . . Dualism 
slides over into what I call the "Chosen 
People Syndrome." When there is One 
Right True and Only Way -- Ours! --
and everybody else is wrong, then those 
who are wrong are damned and the 
damned are evi/.24 
For Starhawk, Wicca is a practice for 
activists. Its insight is that polarities are in 
balance, not at war. Energy moves in cycles at 
times flowing outward, pushing us to change 
the world, at times inward, transforming our-
selves. It must always turn and return, and so 
be renewed. In paganism, the Goddess does not 
rule over the world as in monotheism. On the 
contrary, in paganism, the Goddess is the world: 
"The Goddess is ourselves and the world -- to 
link with Her is to engage actively with the 
world and all its problems." 25 
Lucy does just this. As we have seen she 
has joined the humans to try to prevent a 
holocaust on earth. She helps to organize the 
"Great Revolution of the Lower Orders" on the 
ark. She is helpful and loving to humans and 
animals alike. She brings light to the lower 
orders of the ark, where the humans out of 
favour with Noah (and therefore with God) and 
the animals are kept. Lucy bonds strongly with 
the other animals and, after her final"shedding 
of skin," she herself while still "human" has 
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become more animal-like: "The face -- this time 
-- was neither round nor angular, but wide and 
flat, with extraordinary eyes of an almost 
golden colour: animal eyes, fierce and tender." 26 
Lucy is an activist in the best sense of the 
word, an earth activist. 
In his article, "Paganism as Resistance," 
Christopher Manes writes: 
The rise of radical environmentalism 
and neo-paganism occurred almost 
simultaneously, no doubt in response 
to the same concerns over the 
desacralization of the earth that 
modern culture represents . ... The 
large number of neo-pagans in the 
radical environmental movement 
confirms the fact that people in-
volved in the struggle against ac-
cumulated power sense an affinity 
between Deep Ecology and "The Old 
Ways" as Gary Snyder calls the 
primal religions.21 
There is now a growing convergence in 
the ecology movement between religion and 
science. In Not Wanted on the Voyage, this 
convergence is represented by the marriage of 
Lucy, the "pagan devil," and Ham, the "scientist." 
But what are we talking about when we say 
"science" and "scientist" in this context? The 
debate between pantheism and paganism 
illuminates this.28 The "science-oriented" pan-
theists stress the mystica I approach to science. 
Pantheist author Harold Wood refers to genet-
icist Barbara McClintoch and her concept of a 
science which "embraces the world," and to 
Spinoza, Ernst Haeckel, John Muir and Rachel 
Carson as examples of pantheistic scientists. 
He could have added Gilbert White and Henry 
David Thoreau. These individuals are part of 
what historian of ecology, Donald Worster, calls 
the Arcadian tradition in ecology, clearly not 
the reductionist mechanists of classical renais-
sance science or "systems" ecology. 29 In Not 
Wanted on the Voyage, Lucy's husband Ham is 
such a scientist. 
Now, if we look at the "pagan" side of 
the debate Starhawk speaks, for example, of 
the new physics as evidence of pagan support 
for a non-reductionist science.30 In fact, 
Starhawk points out in The Spiral Dance that 
the split between religion and science is a false 
duality of absolutism: 
When God is felt to be separate 
from the physical world, religion 
can be split off from science . ... 
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But the Goddess is manifest in the 
physical world, and the more we 
understand its workings the better we 
know her. Science and religion are both 
quests for truth-- they differ only in 
their methodology and the set of 
symbols they use to describe their 
findings. The field of inquiry is the 
same ... . Observation is meditation as 
the builders of Stonehenge-- temple. 
astronomical observatory, calendar, and 
calculator -- knew wel/.81 
Lucy is very in touch with science. She 
is able to produce tungsten lamps when they 
have not even been invented. She knows about 
Einstein even though he has not even been born 
yet and both she and Ham share that deep sense 
of inquiry that always questions everything. 
This is why she eventually has to leave heaven. 
What she and Ham share most is that love of 
the earth, that deep bonding common to 
naturalist and pagan alike. 
I find some excellent and inspiring con-
siderations from both the pagan and pantheist-
ic perspectives on science. Certainly, when both 
perspectives recognize the on-going development 
of a spiritually inspired, earth-centred science, 
then a sharper distinction can be made between 
this kind of science, a "hands-off" science of 
curiosity and joy, and the old reductionist 
science of manipulation and domination. 
What I have called the "epistemology of 
the heart" is an epistemology for the enchanted 
world, our world if we open ourselves up to it. 
The beings represented by the Little Prince and 
by Lucy, whole beings in touch with their high 
selves, are really our own selves, our deepest 
selves. This ecological mode of perception, 
"extraordinary consciousness" as Starhawk puts 
it "is broad, holistic, and undifferentiated, sees 
patterns and relationships rather than fixed 
objects."32 It is what Starhawk calls starlight 
vision "dim and silvery, revealing the play of 
woven branches and the dance of shadows, 
sensing pathways as spaces in the whole."33 It 
is the mode of perception of the unconscious 
mind, younger self and high self. 
Dolores LaChapelle, in Sacred Land, 
Sacred Sex: Rapture of the Deep, speaks of 
nature's patterns as the "old ways," both deep 
inside us from our own deep past (including 
our pre-human animal past) and those patterns 
outside us in the natural environment. In trying 
to express the inexpressible, she speaks of the 
Chinese concept of the dynamic pattern of the 
universe, the web of relationships, a web "woven 
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by no weaver."34 Although this is Taoist, I 
think it fairly expresses a pagan understanding 
of the web of life. This is a very ecological 
metaphor as well. As such, it is both very 
ancient and completely contemporary, the web 
of life of our enchanted planet earth. The 
pagan understanding of the goddess is another 
metaphor for it. 
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The World Conservation Strategy 
As A Dystopian Vision 
The World Conservation Strategy (WCS) was 
published in 1980 by the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), the United Nations En-
vironmental Programme (UNEP), the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESC0).1 Its mandate 
was to establish a universal understanding of 
environmental problems and to secure the 
acceptance of planetary management goals. In 
the face of massive desertification, 
deforestation, the erosion of soils, the pollution 
of freshwater supplies, the extinction of species 
and many other ecological disasters, it seemed 
prudent to have one overall strategy for dealing 
with environmental ills. The authors of the 
WCS agreed that non-human resources had to be 
identified and protected in order to secure the 
integrity of ecosystems as well as our own 
future. 
The question of the value of the WCS is 
debated by those who want to protect wild 
nature (preservationists) and those who want to 
manage it (conservationists), that is, by those 
who reject the industrial growth ethos and its 
conservation/development imperatives and those 
who want to remain on the path that industrial 
society is following. The approach that the WCS 
takes toward nature is clearly not new. In fact, 
its philosophical roots appear to extend deep 
into the history of Western thought where it 
finds its place in a tradition of utopian 
speculation that asserts the dichotomy between 
reason and emotion. 
In this paper I will examine the WCS as 
expressive of that utopian tradition, a tradition 
which only helps, in the end, to do the bidding 
of the industrial growth society. Contrary to 
the utopian tone of the WCS, I think that the 
premises upon which it rests are flawed, and 
as such give us good reason to locate this 
document in a dystopian tradition of thought, 
a tradition which has shown itself to be in-
tolerant of nature. 
The aim of the WCS is to help advance 
the achievement of development through the 
conservation of living resources. The Strategy 
. . . by John R. Ltvmgston 




explains the contribution of living 
resource conservation to human survival 
and to sustainable development; 
identifies the priority conservation issues 
and the main requirements for dealing 
with them; 
proposes effective ways for achieving the 
Strategy's aim.2 
Its three main objectives are: 
I) to maintain essential ecological processes 
and life-support systems (such as soil 
regeneration and protection, the recycling 
of nutrients, and the cleansing of waters) 
on which human survival and 
development depend; 
2) to preserve genetic diversity (the range 
of genetic material found in the world's 
organisms) on which depend the func-
tioning of many of the above processes 
and life-support systems, the breeding 
programmes necessary for the protection 
and improvement of cultivated plants, 
domesticated animals and micro-or-
ganisms, as well as many scientific and 
medical advances, technical innovations 
and the security of the many industries 
that use living resources; 
3) to ensure the sustainable utilization of 
species and ecosystems (notably fish and 
other wildlife, forests and grazing lands) 
which support millions of rural commun-
ities as well as major industries.3 
These, however, were only its overall 
aims. Its specific goals and their justification 
were more fully delineated along six lines: 
1) development, the modification of the 
biosphere, should be undertaken to 
"satisfy human needs and improve the 
qua)jty of human life" (sec. 1.3). 
2) conservation, the management of the 
biosphere, must "yield the greatest sus-
John R. Livingston is a student at the Faculty of Environmental Studies. His thesis work concentrates on a comparison 
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tainable benefit to present and future 
generations," must be "positive, embracing 
preservation, maintenance, sustainable 
utilization, restoration and enhancement 
of the natural environment" (sec. 1.4). 
3) the preservation of genetic materials 
entails "the protection and improvement 
of cultivated plants and domesticated 
animals" for scientific advance, technical 
innovation, and the security of industry 
(sec. 1. 7). 
4) since much of the planet will be trans-
formed, such alterations must achieve the 
social and economic objectives of develop-
ment (sec 1.7). 
5) "where agriculture can supply more food, 
more economically and on a sustainable 
basis, than can the utilization of wildlife, 
the conversion of wildlife habitat to 
farmland is rational" (sec. 7.7). 
6) for "global solidarity," a new "economic 
order [must be] achieved, a new environ-
mental ethic [must be] adopted, human 
populations [must] stabilize and sustainable 
modes of development [must] become the 
rule rather than the exception" if we are 
to prevent further environmental 
deterioration (sec. 1.12). 4 
As it stands, the WCS seems to be very 
reasonable and common-sensical. How else can 
we proceed? Human life will be improved and 
benefited, and nature will be conserved. 
Throughout, the WCS is written in a tone that 
suggests that it is beyond being impugned, that 
its tenets demand an adherence that is morally 
obligatory. On the surface it appears to allay 
even the objections of those who decry a 
managerial approach to nature. After all, the 
Strategy appears to advocate solutions that are 
positive and embracing, solutions which seem 
to speak on behalf of nature. According to the 
stated goals of the WCS, however, the economic 
goals of industry will take precedence over the 
preservation of nature. This is evidenced by the 
status that agriculture is accorded by the 
"rational conversion of wildUfe habitat to 
farmland," and by the reduction of domesticated 
species to "genetic information." What is more, 
with the acceptance and implementation of the 
WCS, it is reasoned that a new environmental 
ethic will be adopted, that human populations 
will stabilize, and that all humans will benefit 
from the new economic order that would result 
from a stabilized population and the adoption 
of an environmental ethic. However, to achieve 
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such an economic order we need global 
solidarity. As the WCS states in section 16.11, 
the only problem facing the strategy is "not one 
of not knowing what to do, but of getting 
agreed action done." Shortly after the WCS was 
published, people who examined the document 
began to wonder what the WCS was really 
trying to say. It became clear to readers who 
are defenders of wild Nature that the main 
problem facing the strategy was not one of 
"getting agreed action done." What came under 
attack was the WCS's underlying assumption 
that it offers the solution to all environmental 
problems by its definitions of "environmental" 
and "problem." 
Clearly there are at least two problems 
which advocates of the protection of non-human 
phenomena felt were not sufficiently addressed 
by the WCS. The WCS never sets forth a clear 
argument for the use of Nature to feed a 
growing human population. Since an 
exponentially growing human population would 
necessitate t he resource development of natural 
areas, and protection of such areas would, 
consequently, become virtually impossible, we 
have to wonder why the WCS only makes brief 
mention of the need for human populations to 
stabilize. Preservationists also argue that the 
non-quantifiable and non-economic values which 
they attribute to nature are given insufficient 
treatment in the document. The WCS concludes 
that wildlife has only "symbolic, ritual or 
cultural importance" (sec. 4.9). 
What is perhaps most significant, though, 
is the underlying worldview of the WCS which 
such omissions illuminate. It is clear that the 
WCS assumes that salvation lies in i ncreased 
productivity, and that conservation is not an 
attitude or an activity but the centre of author-
ity, the ground of ethical obedience. (Notice 
that throughout, strategies are to be adopted 
because conservation demands "X"; moral respon-
sibility lies not in the individual but in obedi-
ence to the development ethic, and grounds for 
accepting or rejecting this authority are never 
set for in premises. Conservation/development 
is given a strange independent, transcendent 
status.) The WCS also assumes that development 
is a global necessity, that science and technology 
can solve any environmental problem, and that 
the status quo must be maintained. The bottom-
line is that it assumes global utility and insists 
on global unity, universal acceptance and 
application of the industrial growth ethos and 
the conservation/development imperative. We 
notice, however, that because the WCS takes 
their assumptions to be obvious and insists on 
objectives that arc taken for granted, the 
worldview the Strategy espouses is never clearly 
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set forth. We now turn our attention to see how 
these assumptions, objectives and western bias 
came to be obvious or taken for granted. 
The purpose of the remainder of this paper 
is to sketch the historical root of the 
commodification of nature in Western culture 
and to illuminate how the WCS embraces and 
perpetuates this ideology. The intended product 
is to show how the utopian speculation in much 
of Western philosophy has lead toward a 
dystopian relationship with nature once it has 
been put into practice. 
The World Conservation Strategy did not 
spring out of a vacuum. Its nature-intolerant 
cosmology has been around in some form 
seemingly forever. Many authors5 have claimed 
that Western society's relation to nature was 
pe rverted in the original Judeo-Christian notion 
of Genesis which gave us the first concrete 
statement of our separation from nature: 
Be fruitful and multiply and replenish 
the earth and subdue it; and hare 
dominion over the fish of the sea,and 
over the fowl of the air, and over every 
living thing that moveth upon the earth. 
(Genesis 1 :28) 
Very early then, it seems that we have a 
recipe for planetary management. Humans, 
created in God's image, stand at the apex of 
creation and are custodians of God's power on 
earth. There is a problem of interpretation, 
however, with this role. In one view human 
beings may be seen as stewa rds who must act 
responsibly towards that w h ich they have 
proprietary rights over. In another view, the 
concepts of power and subdual seem to act as 
imperatives compelling humans to adopt certain 
attitudes and realize certain courses of action. 
In neither case, however, is the absolute 
dominion over nature questioned. Viewed as 
despot or responsible steward, humanity, in 
either interpretation, has f ull rights to do what 
it wants with its natural resources. 
Clearly the human/nature schism has been 
around a long time. It was certainly in place 
when Plato began to ruminate about humanity's 
role on earth and the ~erfectly just state: 
Utopia. In The Republic Plato attempted to 
give humanity, now thoroughly removed from 
nature conceptually, a notion of ho w the 
perfect ly just state, predicated on reason, might 
work. Human beings, supposedly freed from 
any ecological system, required a rational, 
artific ial system to regulate and structure their 
actions in relation to one another. What 
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subsequent generations inherited from Plato was 
the explicit argument that no system could be 
considered utopian unless it fully stressed 
harmony, order and stability, and reason above 
any emotional or physical concerns. 
Even though Plato set the precedent for 
a Utopia grounded in the separation of hu-
manity and nature, reason and emotion, he was 
no despot over nature. The identification of 
Utopia with the despotic treatment of the non-
human arose some twenty centuries after Plato 
with the advent of scientific inquiry. Francis 
Bacon in particular, viewed science as the 
handmaiden of Utopia. He declared that by 
means of science, humanity was in a position 
to not only have knowledge of nature's secrets, 
but also to master it. Not one to mince words, 
Bacon declared that "natural science therefore 
has no other goal than to more firmly establish 
and extend the power and domination of 
humanity over nature." 7 Bacon, like Rene 
Descartes, clearly voiced the basic values, 
beliefs and assumptions of humanism predicated 
on Plato's dualism and emphasis on reason.8 He 
steadfastly maintained though, in contrast to 
Plato, that power, control and subdual must 
direct our perceptions, decisions and actions if 
we take reason to be the means by which to 
establish Utopia. He viewed natural objects 
with contempt for they represented the an -
tithesis of reason. They were impediments that 
had to be overcome. In order to realize Utopia 
we had to rid ourselves of anything non-
rational. Freedom lay in the emancipation from 
determined bodily responses, from biological 
constraints. 
Though there were other interpretations 
of humanity's role on earth, humanistic specu-
lation shared some common f ea tu res. It was 
assumed that in knowledge of Nature and the 
self all humans could be liberated from super-
stitious and false doctrines and made socially 
equal through advances in science. For humans 
to realize their utopian ideals, they had to exist 
in a thoroughly rational, human-centered 
universe. Emotion, being antagoniStiC to 
Reason, had to be expunged from human nature. 
These attributes -- the control of Nature, the 
control of self, faith in human abilities and a 
belittling of the physical and the natural-- were 
endorsed under the new set of beliefs, 
assumptions and values that became a major 
strain of humanism. By the sixteenth century 
human interests and values were given a 
completely superordinate pos ition with regards 
to the interests of non-human nature. Within 
humanism utopian thinkers asserted the dignity 
and worth of humans and their capacity to 
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achieve self-realization through the use of 
Reason and the scientific method. 
Humanistic conceptions of Utopia took on 
a new dimension with the union of science and 
technology. The union of scientific research, 
technological innovation and industrial mass-
production allowed Nature to be productively 
managed and "harvested." Once machines made 
it possible to suit our own ends, the utopian 
ideal of all humans being equal materially, if 
not soCially, seemed to be at hand. In hindsight 
we know this did . not occur. The reason 
equality did not occur is because there are 
implicit contradictions in the humanistic, 
rational conception of Utopia that thwa rt its 
realization. 
Bacon's rationalism and dualism allowed 
him to view the utopian state like the 
mind/body dualism. Just as the mind must rule 
the body so in Utopia the rulers must govern 
the people. However, if humanism believes a 
goal of Utopia is the social equality of the 
people, where is social equality in a state that 
emphasizes rulers and subjects, the governors 
and the governed? Reason dictates the'subject/-
object split between the rulers and the ruled in 
Utopia. Hence, as long as we stress rationalism 
and dualism as necessary conditions of Utopia, 
we cannot establish the perfect state, a state 
with social equality. Since, on the one hand, a 
major strain of humanism asserts the essential 
dignity and equality of humans, and 
rationalism, on the other hand, dictates a 
subject-object relation in Utopia, there is a 
contradiction between the egalitarian ideal of 
the former and the necessarily elitist view of 
the latter. The very ideals of humanism, when 
united with rationalist imperatives, form a 
contradiction that makes the realization of those 
selfsame ideals impossible. One cannot have a 
social structure that is at once egalitarian and 
elitist. Thus most critics of rationalism agree 
that humanistic ideals tend to be rejected in 
favour of a reasonable, functionally efficient 
Utopia. Consequently, the formal structure of 
Utopia tends to supplant the human content. 
Therefore when Utopia is taken to its logical 
extreme, Dystopia is the inevitable result. 
Utopia becomes Dystopia in a particularly 
evident way in two twentieth century novels, 
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World9 and George 
Orwell's 198410. Rather than demonstrating this 
trend theoretically, both authors set out to 
portray a completely rational, ordered Utopia . 
The novels are horrifying because they express 
the logical conclusion of Platonic and 
humanistic values. Themes basic to both works 
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grow out of Utopian beliefs such as freedom 
through reason, the denial of the emotions, the 
denial of the self, the mastery of Nature 
(including human Nature -- genetically and 
conceptually), the sense of power entailed in the 
subject/object split, the dignity of humans, the 
desire for social equality, the need for 
systemization and the need for standardization. 
Huxley and Orwell conclude that such notions 
when solely rationally-based are, if not blatant-
ly chimerical or self -contradictory, then deci-
dedly inhuman. They show in their fiction that 
reason, as the sole organizing principle of 
Utopia, debases humans by stripping them of 
their dignity and individuality. In order to 
maximize social utility, people are reduced to 
the status of objects useful to the state. In 
Brave New World we see the individual defined 
solely in terms of concepts such as "progress,"11 
"improvement "12 "wasted "13 "gratuitous "14 and 
' , ' 
the list goes on. All human elements, such as 
freedom, self -expression, and spontaneity, are 
superceded by the person's functional role in the 
state. In such a state, each person must fulfill 
his/her appointed task without thought of 
freedom or equality (in 1984 Orwell achieves 
this by making the concepts of freedom and 
slavery tautological). Such concepts are 
dangerous because they are inefficient. As 
Huxley points out, the worst that can be said of 
such a state is that it is inefficient rather than 
inhuman. In Utopia humans lose those things 
that make them human (emotions and the desire 
to create), and become slaves to their own 
creation. Furthermore, because humans have 
no access to history in Utopia (that is, to the 
roots of their beliefs and concepts) they have 
no idea who they are. Not knowing who they 
are or what they want, freedom and equality 
cease to be their goals. 
What Orwell and Huxley attempted to 
show in their texts was that the very human 
attitude that commodifies Nature, that turns it 
into a source of resources for the attainment 
of human goals, turns in on itself and com-
modifies humans. In denying human physical 
existence, human emotions and human individ-
uality in the hope that their rationality will 
liberate them and make them equal with others 
(as the Platonic-humanist tradition assumes) 
humans lose their essence, their intrinsic worth. 
1984 was published in 1949, the WCS in 
1980. The authors of the WCS should have 
known that dualistic and humanist utopian 
speculation merged with science and technology 
and taken to its logical extreme, yields Dystopia. 
As I see it, the WCS is the apotheosis of 
dystopian irrationality and inhumanity. The 
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WCS ignores Huxley's and Orwell's call to 
examine history and to trace the roots of our 
assumptions. The central flaw of the WCS is 
that the authors utterly ignore the past. Perhaps 
this is because the past is threatening since it 
indicates the cultural relativity of ideas, and 
the possibility of alternate images, inter-
pretations and values. An awareness of the past 
carries with it a demand to provide the basis or 
justification for our goals and assumptions. The 
past is, in some sense, our conscience. It is the 
enemy of dogmatic pronouncements and 
ideologies. It judges our institutions and makes 
us uneasy about our self-justifications and 
rationalizations. Perhaps, more than anything 
else, it challenges our belief in "necessary" 
activity and "absolute" truth. The only way to 
make us feel better is therefore to forget the 
past. In this way we can deem our activity 
right, appropriate and necessary, and our 
decisions and objectives valid. It seems to me 
that, above all else, the WCS is an a void a nee of 
the past. 
In ignoring history it is easier for the WCS 
to claim that it is rational and it is also easier 
to justify a strategy which would otherwise 
appear to be a confusing, if not contradictory, 
set of recommendations, suggestions and 
objectives. By ignoring history, the WCS finds 
it is easy to equate Reason very narrowly with 
efficiency, productivity and utility and to 
overlook its much broader base of curiosity, 
humility and wonder. The WCS assumes the 
Platonic division of reason and emotion is an 
absolute truth. It debases reason by identifying 
rationality with expediency. Reason, in the 
WCS, becomes rationalization, a cynical 
justification for behaviour that acts without 
reflection. Every page of the WCS carries 
objectives that arc justified because they 
improve and enhance, are efficient or useful. 
Where, though, arc the anticipated criticisms 
that force definitions and arguments? Why does 
Nature require improvement and enhancement? 
Should non-human nature be red uced to useful 
commodities for us? Should appropriate 
behaviour be defined simply in terms of 
efficiency? 
In 1984 Orwell made it clear that, in order 
for the stable, efficient and rational Utopia 
predicated on power, control and subdual to 
work, it must invent the past. It must be 
completely standardized/system-
atized/homogenized and must have the complete 
obedience of the members of the state. To 
achieve its ends, the perfect state must destroy 
individuality. Individuality presupposes ques-
tioning and self-expression, characteristics that 
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undermine authority. To protect its sovereign-
ty the state must ensure individuals view 
themselves solely in terms of their efficient 
functioning. This is most easily realized 
through genetic engineering and through the 
destruction of language, in other words, the 
elimination of real dichotomies. By making 
dualistic concepts tautological (that is, self-
contained, self -perpetuating and self-justified) 
the state ensures that the individual cannot 
think or question. In controlling the individ-
ual, both biologically and conceptually, the state 
ensures that its objectives are realized, and its 
commands are obeyed. 
What if we view the WCS as a utopian 
vision? The WCS's perfect world is modelled 
on the Pia tonic and humanistic Utopia of order, 
efficiency and Reason. Its insistence on the 
need for global solidarity entails the complete 
standardization and homogenization of 
worldviews. There is no room for unique 
cultural conceptions of conservation. Idiosyn- . 
cratic conceptions and behaviour undermine the 
industrial growth ethos. As I said at the 
beginning, the security of industries employing 
living resources is specifically mentioned in two 
of the three central aims of the Strategy. 
Control through genetic engineering is also a 
given, though not yet for the human species. 
Perhaps the greatest indication of the 
WCS's dystopian vision is its equating of 
conservation with development. Historically, 
naturalists, among others, have regarded these 
concepts as polar opposites. By making these 
concepts tautological the WCS clearly exhibits 
the role it believes it plays, as the ultimate 
authority on planetary management. It won't 
tolerate opposition and its mandate requires no 
justification. By pre-empting individual 
questioning (tautologies arc necessarily true) 
it hopes to convince the reader that its pro-
nouncements and objectives are unquestionably 
necessary. Every strategy is seen to be logically 
entailed by the i nitial tautology. Definitions 
are to be seen as superfluous, unnecessary. As 
in 1984, obedience is ensured by making thought 
and questioning impossible. The destruction of 
language a nd the violation of the rules of 
rationality, permits the WCS to be self-
justi fying. The Strategy's conclusion that 
opposition to the strategy "is not one of not 
knowing what to do, but of getting agreed 
action do ne" really does cease to be a problem 
once .informed dissent is disallowed and once 
conceptual flexibility is lost. Having dissolved 
the distinction between conservation and 
development, the WCS assures the fulfillment 
of its utopian objectives. With the demise of 
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critical acuity the WCS can effect the world-
wide acceptance of its resourcist bias, of the 
industrial growth ethos and the conser-
vation/development imperative. The utopian 
goal of global solidarity can be achieved 
through a standardization of beliefs and values. 
The WCS embraces Plato's dualism and 
hierarchy of values/virtues, Bacon's notions of 
control and power, and the humanistic ideal of 
liberty and salvation achieved through science 
and technology. At the same time the Strategy 
seeks to make Reason the sole organizing 
principle of Utopia. It thus overlooks the 
implicit social contradictions entailed by the 
realization of a completely rational system and 
the implicit contradictions for the preservation 
of wild non-human Nature. In short it fails to 
see the Orwellian ramifications of its tunnel-
vision. The following ingredients of the WCS's 
worldview indicate, I think, a dystopian vision: 
I) it assumes utility I efficiency and prod uc-
tivity; 
2) it assumes improvement and enhancement; 
3) it assumes global economic solidarity; 
4) it assumes unquestioned obedience to the 
conservation/ development imperative; 
5) there is a lack of definitions, and reasoned 
arguments; 
6) there is no sense of history, of the 
possibility of revising images and values; 
7) the language is tautological; 
8) it assumes genetic engineering is positive; 
9) it disregards individuality; 
10) it assumes systemization/ standardization/ -
homogeniza tion; 
11) it assumes domination and control; 
12) it over-emphasises Reason; 
13) it has complete faith in technology and 
management; 
1 4) it provides its own self- justification. 
That these ingredients mirror those of 
1984, and that 1984 is seen as completely 
inhumane and cruel suggests to me that some-
thing very dangerous has happened to our 
thinking. I think that the almost universal 
acceptance of the WCS is cause for alarm. 
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Water on Fire 
A hand 
holds 
Water on Fire 
A palm 
bleeds 
Invisible in Silence 






A shower of shards 
Sprinkled 
by 










the shores of sky. 
They flow inked blind 
on vapour currents 
voices only 
in the warm spring air. 
By the pond 
spring peepers 
tone in dialogue, 
tuning forks 
struck on sky. 
In a field 
unseen 
night geese move. 
Channels of air 
are arteries 
in a universal 
shift and pulse 
of thought. 
by A.C. 
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